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The international tax literature" lacks any comprehensive discus-
sion2 of the impact of foreign losses3 on the United States income
tax liability of United States persons.4 Many significant aspects of
the subject are left unexplored in the decisional law as well.5 This
may be explained by the profitability of United States direct invest-
ment abroad since 1950.6 During 1962-1965, for example, United
States persons invested about $15 billion abroad in manufacturing
facilities and earned an average return on investment estimated in
one Treasury study at 11.7 percent.
7
1. Of the major texts and casebooks on the international aspects of United States
income taxation, only my forthcoming work treats the subject of foreign losses broadly.
See IV. GIFFORD, INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING ch. II, § 8 (forthcoming 1974).
2. Commentary on particular aspects of the subject includes: Effects of losses on
foreign tax credit computations-E. OWENS, THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT chs. 3/2D2d,
4/3C2, 4/3C3b, 4/7E, 5/5A, App. I (3AId) (1961); Dailey, The Concept of the Source
of Income, 15 TAX L. REV. 415, 452-62 (1960); Gifford, "Excess" Distributions Under
Section 963: Computation of the Foreign Tax Credit, 26 TAX L. REV. 317 (1971); Moder,
Subpart F Income and Minimum Distributions, 48 TAXES 118, 129-32 (1970); Waris,
Current Foreign Income Problems Involving Subpart F and Related Statutes, N.Y.U.
27TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 977 (1969). Currency losses-D. RAVENSCROFr, TAXATION AND
FOREIGN CURRENCY: THE INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE RAI FLUC-
TUATIONS (1973); Costello, Tax Impact of Currency Exchange Rate Fluctuations, 26 TAX
LAW. 399 (1973); Ravenscroft, Currency Revaluation and Devaluation-Tax Effects, TAX
MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO No. 280 (1973). Expropriation losses-Patty, Tax Aspects of
Cuban Expropriations, 16 TAX L. REV. 415 (1961); Peel, The Tax Problems Caused by
Expropriation of Property by a Foreign Government, N.Y.U. 30TH INST. ON FED. TAX.
1387 (1971). War losses-MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INCONME TAXATION §§ 28.59a-i; Giljum,
Losses-Theft, Wagering, War, and Confiscation, TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO No. 278
(1973); Levy, War Casualty Loss Deductible After Enemy Seizure, 7 J. TAX. 167 (1957).
3. The phrase, "foreign losses," in this discussion will not be limited to losses which
technically arise from or are allocable to "sources without the United States" within
the meaning of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 [hereinafter cited as IRC]. See IRC
§§ 861(b), 862(b), 863(a)-(b). Rather, the phrase is used broadly to include losses which
arise out of business activity carried on abroad by "United States persons," see IRC
§ 7701(a)(30), whether directly through an individual citizen or resident's sole proprie-
torship, a partnership, or corporate branch or indirectly through a domestic or foreign
corporation. The losses may be "current," arising from day to day operations of the
business, or "terminal," arising upon the disposition or winding up of the foreign
business. Current losses include normal operating losses as well as losses connected with
fluctuations in the value of foreign currency. Terminal losses include losses on a sale
or other disposition of the assets of the foreign business or the shares of an incor-
porated business, expropriation of such assets or shares, a liquidation of an incor-
porated business, or a decrease in the value of stock or securities therein.
4. IRC § 7701(a)(30) defines "United States persons" to include citizens and resi-
dents, domestic partnerships, domestic corporations, and domestic estates and trusts.
5. Like the commentary, the decisions are primarily limited to foreign tax credit
computations, source of taxable income, currency exchange losses, expropriation losses,
and war losses.
6. For a history of United States foreign direct investments during this period see
G. HUFBAUER AND F. ADLER, OVERSEAS MANUFACTURING INVESTMENT AND THE BALANCE
OF PAYMENTS, U.S. TREASURY DEP'T TAX POLICY RESEARCH STUDY No. 1, at 10-12 (1968)
(updating Bell, Private Capital Movements and the U.S. Balance-of-Payments Position, in
JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 87TH CONG., 2D SESs., FACTORS AFFECTING THE BALANCE OF
PAYMENTS 410-14 (1962)); INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 56-59 (1973).
7. G. HUFBAUER AND F. ADLER, supra note 6, Tables 2-1 & 2-2. While most foreign
ventures have been profitable, there have been wide variations of profitability, and
some foreign ventures actually lost money. During fiscal 1966, of the total of 19,617
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However limited the extent of foreign losses in the past, United
States investors may become more concerned with such losses in the
future, as worldwide competition among multinational and local en-
terprises increases, as worldwide interest rates and other costs in-
crease, and as widespread monetary adjustments occur. s Moreover,
with the taxation of foreign income on every significant congres-
sional agenda for tax reform,9 the tax treatment of foreign losses
has become a particularly appropriate and timely subject for analysis.10
This article will analyze the United States tax treatment of foreign
losses under existing law by applying a symmetry test and then
recommend changes which would eliminate asymmetries in the present
treatment of foreign income and loss.
active controlled foreign corporations, 4,305 reported net losses totaling $728,224,000
for the period. U.S. Treasury Dep't Publication No. 479, Foreign Income and Taxes
Reported on Corporation Income Tax Returns 270-73 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Treasury Publication No. 479].
8. See, e.g., Rose, Multinational Corlporations in a Tough New World, FORTUNE,
August 1973, at 134 ("Still, by the mid-Seventies, overseas investment should begin to
lose its attractiveness. It is expected that, instead of expanding at a rate of ten percent
a year, multinational companies will maintain a more modest rate of overseas growth-
say, between five and seven percent.").
9. S. 151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) and H.R. 62, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973), the
"Burke-Hartke Bill," would end the deferral of United States tax on the earnings of
foreign subsidiaries of domestic corporations, repeal the foreign tax credit for cor-
porations, impose an immediate tax at ordinary income rates on the transfer of tech-
nology to a foreign subsidiary, restrict depreciation allowable to foreign corporations,
and eliminate the earned income exclusion for employees of domestic corporations
and their foreign affiliates. H.R. 1040, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), the "Corman Bill"
or the "Tax Equity Act of 1973," would restrict losses attributable to mineral proper-
ties located outside the United States, repeal entirely the exemption for earned in-
come from foreign sources, repeal the special deduction allowed to Western Hemi-
sphere trade corporations (WHTC's), eliminate the deferral of United States tax on
the earnings of foreign subsidiaries of domestic corporations, repeal the tax exemp-
tion for ships under foreign flag, and restrict the foreign tax credit to foreign taxes
imposed on income taxable by the United States. The House Ways and Means Com-
nittee held hearings on tax reform, including changes affecting the taxation of foreign
income beginning in March 1973. The administration proposals for tax reform include
provisions eliminating the deferral of United States tax on "foreign tax haven manu-
facturing corporations" ("run away plants" and foreign corporations which take advan-
tage of foreign tax incentives). They also include provisions for taxing the profits from
activities not fully subject to United States tax to the extent of foreign losses pre-
viously deducted against domestic income. Department of the Treasury, Proposals for
Tax Change, April 30, 1973, at 159-75. The administration's proposals were "clarified"
in a Treasury release, Foreign Tax Haven Manufacturing Corporations, June 11, 1973.
Representative Vanik has introduced a substitute foreign trade policy bill, H.R. 8943,
designed to influence the final trade bill, with provisions repealing the Western Hemi-
sphere trade corporation and DISC provisions, changing the foreign tax credit to a
deduction, eliminating deferral on taxation of foreign income, and removing certain
rapid depreciation advantages for foreign investment.
10. No data are published concerning the impact of foreign losses on United States
tax. See Staffs of Treasury Dep't and Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Taxati6n,
Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures, June 1, 1973 (estimating revenue losses totaling
S675 million for 1972, attributable to such international Code provisions as the earned
income exclusion (50 million), the exclusions for individuals (S10 million) and cor-
porations (S80 million) in United States possessions, WHTC's ($50 million), DISC's ($100
million), deferral of income of foreign subsidiaries ($325 million), and lack of gross-up
for less developed country corporations ($60 million).
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I. The Symmetry Criterion
An evaluation of the present scheme of taxation of foreign losses
requires the development of an analytic framework for the under-
taking, in view of the previous inattention to this area on the part
of Congress and commentators alike. While the traditional criteria
of equity" and neutrality'12 as well as such pragmatic criteria as do-
mestic economic effects,13 international economic effects, 14 and ad-
ministrative convenienceI5 all suggest themselves as candidates for
judging the present system, a different criterion-symmetry-will be
employed.
Symmetry requires, at a minimum, that a loss incurred by a tax-
payer in connection with an activity which would have produced
taxable income if profitable, be deductible against other income of
the taxpayer.' 6 More strictly, symmetry would seem to require that
the character and timing of the recognition of any such loss be the
same as the character and timing of any income which the activity
would have produced.' 7 This criterion has been recognized as a
proper standard for gauging the effectiveness of an income tax sys-
tem's treatment of gains and losses.' 8
While the legislative history of the Internal Revenue Code [Code]
provisions dealing with the taxation of foreign income is relatively
prodigal in its discussions of the how's and why's for the taxation
of profits, it is virtually silent as to the tax effects of losses and
the reasons therefor.' 9 This situation is understandable in view of
11. See note 199 infra.
12. See pp. 340-44 infra.
13. See pp. 344-46 infra.
14. See p. 353 infra.
15. See pp. 346-47 infra.
16. Pechman states that, in principle, capital losses should be deductible in full
against either capital gains or ordinary income. J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 98
(rev. ed. 1971).
17. Pechman notes that the timing problem is a kind of asymmetry: Taxpayers
can time sales to realize losses promptly while postponing gains as long as possible.
Id. The Musgraves appear to accept this characterization of the tax effects of timing.
See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 231, 482-85
(1973).
18. See R. MUSCRAVE & P. MUscRAvE, supra note 17, at 231, 236, 290, 482-85; J.
PECHMAN, supra note 16, at 98.
19. The Revenue Act of 1962 represents the most comprehensive congressional exami-
nation of the taxation of foreign income to date, but the related committee reports
advert to the tax effects of foreign losses in only three areas: IRC §§ 952(c), (d) (limiting
subpart F income to earnings and profits of a controlled foreign corporation, reduced by
certain deficits), S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 241-42 (1962); IRC § 1247(a)(2)(A)
(excluding net operating loss deduction from computation of taxable income of foreign
investment companies electing to distribute at least 90 percent of taxable income an-
nually), id. at 294-95; and, obliquely, by reference to "consolidated earnings and profits"
of related corporations under IRC § 963, id. at 266.
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the historical preponderance of gains over losses from foreign 20 as
well as domestic sources.2 1 Absent any indication in the legislative
history as to how and why losses in a particular situation should
be treated, the taxation of gains in that situation, which did receive
the focus of the congressional intent, should logically serve as the
guide in evaluating the tax effects of losses. The very paucity of
legislative history specifically relating to the tax effects of foreign
losses thus buttresses the validity of the symmetry criterion, 22 ex-
cept where the legislative history of a specific Code provision in-
dicates a special purpose for treating losses differently from income.
I. Application of the Symmetry Criterion to United States Tax
Treatment of Foreign Losses
A close scrutiny of relevant Code provisions reveals that the
treatment of foreign income and foreign losses is often asymmetrical.
A. Current Losses
1. In General
The direct effects of current operating losses are set forth in a
straightforward fashion in the Code. The tax of an ordinary United
States resident, citizen, or domestic corporation is based on his, her
or its taxable income.23 The definition of "taxable income" begins
20. See Treasury Publication No. 479, supra note 7, at 270-73. (Of the foreign sub-
sidiaries of domestic corporations with accounting periods ending July 1965 through June
1966, 15,047 subsidiaries earned S16,986,497,000 before taxes while 4,305 subsidiaries
reported losses of $728,224,000.)
21. Id. at 278. The 3,732 domestic parent corporations of the foreign subsidiaries
referred to in note 20 supra reported aggregate net income (less deficits) of 539,905,-
875,000.
22. In other contexts Congress has focused on the tax effects of losses and de-
liberately made them asymmetrical in order to effect some clearly articulated policy.
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46-47 (1942) (IRC § 165(g)(3), permitting
ordinary loss on worthlessness of stock or securities of a subsidiary, as a matter of
equity in light of consolidated return provisions); id. at 51 (IRC § 1231, providing ordi-
nary loss and capital gain treatment on sales of depreciable property and real property
used in a trade or business, as a "material benefit to businesses which, due to de-
pressed conditions, have been compelled to dispose of their plant or equipment at a
loss"); H.R. REP. No. 2198, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1958) (IRC § 1244, permitting or-
dinary loss deduction on sale of "small business stock," in order to increase the volume
of outside funds available for financing small business). No such explicit formulation
of congressional intent exists for the tax effects of the foreign losses discussed herein.
Accordingly, it is not a sufficient answer to the implications of the symmetry criterion,
when considering a given Code provision, to refer to a general intention of benefiting
taxpayers investing abroad. A much more plausible explanation of asymmetrical loss
treatment in the foreign context is congressional inattention.
23. IRC §§ 1 and 11(a) set forth sweeping jurisdictional rules, imposing tax on the
taxable income of "every individual" and "every corporation," respectively. IRC §§ 871
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with the taxpayer's gross income "from whatever source derived"2 4
and subtracts therefrom deductions which are also determined and
allowed without regard to source.25 Computation of the taxable in-
come of these taxpayers may thus involve subtraction of foreign op-
erating losses from domestic gross income.26
Profits and losses of a foreign branch of a regular domestic cor-
poration, which are treated as described above, thus seem to oc-
casion almost perfectly symmetrical tax consequences. 27
But if the taxation of a foreign branch over a period of time,
rather than during a single taxable year, is considered, a significant
asymmetry appears. This asymmetry, which results from the ability
of a domestic corporation to use losses of a foreign branch to offset
other income of the corporation during one or more periods and
then subsequently shield the foreign project from United States tax,




Special cases involving certain classes of United States citizens
and domestic and foreign corporations involve variations from the
norm just described.
a. Citizens Abroad
Section 911 of the Code provides that a citizen2 9 who is present
and 881 cut back this assertion of taxing jurisdiction and limit the taxation of non-
resident aliens (and citizens of United States possessions, IRC § 932(a)) and foreign
corporations to certain income from sources within the United States and income con-
nected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States.
24. IRC § 61(a).
25. IRC § 63(a).
26. If the result of a subtraction is less than zero, the loss may be carried to other
taxable years, within certain statutory limits. See IRC § 172.
27. The only possible exception arises in the foreign currency area. A foreign
branch of a domestic corporation may recognize losses as they arise under the "trans-
action" or "net worth" methods of accounting for branch profits; currency gains may
go unrecognized under the "profit and loss" method. If, as seems most likely, these
methods are "accounting methods" within IRe § 446, cf. Amer. Pad & Textile Co., 16
T.C. 1304 (1951), a taxpayer may not shift from one method to another from year
to year without the Commissioner's permission. See generally Ravenscroft, TAx MAN-
AGEMENT PORTFOLio No. 280, supra note 2, at A-7 to 11. Changes in the regulations could
cure this asymmetry. The regulations applicable to controlled foreign corporations could
serve as the model for branch treatment. Those regulations in effect require controlled
foreign corporations to recognize currency gains and losses as they arise. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.964-1(d)-(e) (1964).
28. See pp. 328-29 infra.
29. "Citizen" is defined for tax purposes in Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(c) (1956) to include
"every person born or naturalized in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction."
If the last phrase is not redundant, it is even more puzzling. In any event the regu-
lations refer to the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §§ 1481-89 (1970)) with
respect to loss of citizenship, which presumably incorporates the ruling in Afroyim
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in foreign countries30 for a period of at least 17 of 18 consecutive
months31 is exempt from United States tax on the first $20,000 of
his or her earned income3 2 from foreign sources, 33 and a citizen who
becomes a bona fide resident 34 of a foreign country for a period
including a whole taxable year may be exempt on the first $20,000
or 525,0003, of his or her earned income.30 In either case, where the
citizen has any income during the taxable year from sources within
the United States or earned income in excess of the maximum ex-
emption, an allocation of the taxpayer's items of deduction must be
made to prevent items properly attributable to the exempt earned
income from reducing other items of gross income.37
Apart from losses which figure into this allocation of deductions
for purposes of determining a taxpayer's includable earned income
in a given taxable year, net losses have presented a special problem
under § 911. In Brewster v. Commissioner,38 the taxpayer, a bona
fide resident of Ireland, engaged in the business of farming there.
Her farming losses exceeded the gross income derived from the
farming business in Ireland each year for a six-year period.3 0 On
v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), and makes inadvertent loss of citizenship (and qualifi-
cation for the benefits of IRC § 911) most unlikely. It is not clear why resident aliens
are not eligible for the benefits of IRC § 911(a)(2).
30. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.911-1(a)(9), (b)(7) (1957) define "foreign country" to mean ter-
ritory under the sovereignty of a government other than the United States. Mere
presence on a foreign flag ship on the high seas is not presence in a foreign country.
Bebb, 36 T.C. 170 (1961).
31. Technically, "510 full days," rather than 17 months, IRC § 911(a)(2). See Treas.
Reg. § 1.911-1(b)(10)-(11) (1957).
32. IRC § 911(a)(2).
33. IRC §§. 861-63 set forth rules for determining the geographic source of various
items of gross income.
34. The regulations define bona fide residence by reference to the principles of
IRC § 871. Treas. Reg. § 1.911-1(a)(2) (1957). Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2(b) (1957), in turn,
characterizes as "residents" persons living in a country with no definite intention as
to their stay or for a purpose which requires an "extended stay" to accomplish. The
cases postulate a one-year rule of thumb, but consider a variety of factors. See, e.g.,
Scott v. United States, 432 F.2d 1388 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
35. The exemption increases to S25,000 after three consecutive years of bona fide
residence. IRC § 911(c)(1)(B).
36. IRC § 911(b) defines "earned income" generally as "compensation for personal
services actually rendered."
In addition to the determination of what is earned income, the principal areas of
dispute under § 911 have been the presence or residence requirements, supra notes 31
and 34, the source of income, and the exclusion of amounts of earned income "paid
by the United States or any agency thereof." IRC §§ 911(a)(1)-(2). The last area has
proved particularly troublesome in the case of citizens employed by foreign governments
or quasi-public bodies whose salaries are paid with funds from United States bodies
such as the Agency for International Development. See, e.g., Marty, P-H 1972 Tax Ct.
Mem. 72,011, 1972 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 26 (1972).
37. IRC §§ 911(a), 265(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.911-2(dN(6) (1963).
38. 473 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'g 55 T.C. 251 (1970).
39. Her total gross income from farming for 1956-60 was $122,393.91, of which
$36,718.16 was determined to constitute "earned" income attributable to personal services
instead of to capital, which was also a material income-producing factor in the business.
Her Irish farming deductions totaled $619,721.27, of which $37,447.35 was allocable to
earned income. 55 T.C. at 252, 255.
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her tax returns she did not claim any exclusion of her gross income
from farming as "earned income" under § 911, but used all of the
deductions to reduce income otherwise subject to United States in-
come tax. The courts agreed with the Internal Revenue Service's
contention that the statute mandatorily excluded the taxpayer's
"earned income" from her gross income and disallowed the deduc-
tions properly allocable to the earned income, even though the de-
ductions thus disallowed exceeded the taxpayer's earned income from
farming.40
This result is consistent with Hempel,41 an earlier Tax Court deci-
sion in which the large foreign expenses of an opera singer were
disallowed because she received a small amount of gross income
abroad.42 Both Brewster and Hempel thus seem to contemplate a
kind of symmetry in § 911 which denies a taxpayer the right to
offset foreign losses against items of United States income where the
profits (if any) from the activity to which the losses relate are not
fully subject to United States tax. The only asymmetry here is a mi-
nor one: While earned income above $20,000 or $25,000 is taxable,
operating losses in excess of $20,000 or $25,000 resulting from an
individual citizen's activities abroad are not deductible under the
Brewster-Hempel doctrine.
b. Lack of Consolidated Return Privilege for Certain Domestic
Subsidiary Corporations
One or more domestic corporations controlled4 3 by a single domes-
tic parent corporation may generally elect to file a consolidated fed-
eral income tax return.4 4 The profits and losses of the corporate
members of the affiliated group filing a consolidated return are
offset in arriving at "consolidated taxable income,"45 which is com-
puted and taxed without regard to its geographic source or the
40. Section 911(b) limits "earned income" from a business in which both personal
services and capital are material income-producing factors to no more than 30 percent
of the taxpayer's share of the net profits of the business. The court restricted this
rule to situations where the business is profitable, but permitted the taxpayer to offset
against United States income the "major part" of her Irish farming losses, not at-
tributable to personal services. 473 F.2d at 163.
41. 1947 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 47,183, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 743 (1947).
42. Her "earned" gross income from foreign sources was S16.20 in 1938; her ex-
penses claimed allocable thereto, .12,001.98. 1947 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 666, 6 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. at 748.
43. Section 1504(a) defines an "affiliated group" of corporations eligible to file a
consolidated return as one connected by 80 percent direct stock ownership with a
common parent corporation or other includable corporations.
44. IRC § 1501.
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-11 (1966).
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provenance of the deductions which enter into the computation.4
The Code, however, excludes certain domestic corporations with
foreign income from the privilege of joining a consolidated return:
corporations entitled to the benefits of § 931 ("possessions corpora-
tions");47 corporations organized under the China Trade Act ("China
Trade Act corporations") ;48 and corporations which qualify or have
qualified as a Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC).49
Since the taxable income of each of these excluded corporations is
subject to favorable treatment under the Code50 an easy inference
would be that the Congress simply adopted a symmetrical approach
and denied the excluded corporations the right to offset foreign
losses against domestic income. The chief obstacle to such a view
is that the Western Hemisphere trade corporation, which is in ef-
fect exempt from tax on up to 14/48ths of its income, 5' may be in-
cluded in a consolidated group. Apart from this large-scale asym-
metry, the treatment of income and loss of the "special" domestic
corporations listed above is riddled with internal asymmetries.
(i). Possessions Corporation
To qualify as a "possessions corporation," the corporation must be
domestic,5 '-' derive at least 80 percent'of its gross income5" for the
three-year period preceding the close of the taxable year from sources
within a possession of the United States,54 and derive at least 50
percent of such gross income from the active conduct of a trade
or business within a possession.55 A possessions corporation includes
46. The foreign tax credit limitation of § 904, see pp. 337-39 infra, which de-
pends on the source of taxable income, does apply to the affiliated group in much
the same way as it applies to a single domestic corporate taxpayer. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1502-4 (1966). But cf. IRO § 1503(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.1503-1 (1955).
47. IRC § 1504(b)(4).
48. IRC § 1504(b)(5).
49. IRC § 1504(b)(7).
50. The favorable treatment ranges from exemption of up to all foreign source
income in the case of a possessions corporation, see IRC § 931(a), or China Trade Act
corporation, see IRC § 941(a), to exemption of one-half of the export-related income
in the case of a DISC, see IRC §§ 991, 995.
51. IRC § 922.
52. IRC § 931(a). Section 901(d) treats a possessions corporation subsidiary as
"foreign," however, for purposes of entitling its shareholders to an "indirect" credit
under § 902 for foreign (including possessions) taxes paid by the subsidiary.
53. Rev. Rul. 56-316, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 597, holds that a corporation meets a simi-
lar test under IRC § 921 only if the corporation in fact has gross income and thus
suggests that a corporation without any gross receipts or with a gross loss (gross re-
ceipts minus cost of goods sold) for the relevant three-year period could not qualify
as a possessions corporation.
54. "Possessions" for this purpose include Puerto Rico, Panama Canal Zone,
American Samoa, Guam, and Wake and Midway Islands, Treas. Reg. § 1.931-1(a)(1)
(1957). Section 931(c) specifically excludes the Virgin Islands.
55. IRC § 931(a)(2)(A).
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in gross income only gross income derived from sources within the
United States.56
The principal impact of § 931 on a possessions corporation op-
erating at a loss 5 7 is to allow deductions only to the extent they
are connected with income from sources within the United States."
3
The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that qualification under
§ 931(a) is elective so that a corporation with net losses from op-
erations in a possession may avoid the bar of deductions not con-
nected with United States income simply by electing out of § 931
status when it operates at a loss."9
Until recently, however, the IRS had ruled that a corporation could
not waive its eligibility under § 931 for the purpose of enjoying the
consolidated return privilege. 60 The Service read the legislative his-
tory to require this result, despite the fact that the consolidated re-
turn provisions6 ' echo the phrase "entitled to the benefits [of § 931]"
which was construed to mean that § 931 treatment was elective.
2
The Service's reading0 3 of the statute thus restricted the utility of
losses of a possessions corporation to their availability as carryovers to
other taxable years of the corporation under the net operating loss
56. IRC § 931(a). The exemption of foreign source income is obviously the most
attractive feature of possessions corporation status. Other advantages, enjoyed in com-
mon with other domestic corporations, include the ability to transfer tax-free under
§ 351 and without an advance ruling under § 367, appreciated property, including
intangibles justifying maximum prices under § 482 for goods manufactured by the
corporation, to a possessions corporation subsidiary, and the ability to liquidate the
subsidiary tax-free under § 332 without a § 367 ruling. The "economic penetration"
requirement of § 931(a)(2) and the availability of local tax exemptions in Puerto Rico,
P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 13, § 252, and American Samoa, 26 REv. CODE OF AMER. SAMOA
§§ 26.0101 et seq., have made possessions corporation subsidiaries most popular as
vehicles for manufacturing activities there. Unless the taxation of amounts "received"
within the United States under IRC § 931(b) can be read to frustrate a tax-free liq-
uidation, it is possible to transfer assets to a possessions corporation subsidiary, op-
erate a manufacturing business in the possession for a period of years, and then dis-
tribute all of the assets of the subsidiary, including its accumulated profits, to the
parent corporation in liquidation-all without payment of any income taxes to the
United States or to the possession. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 17.13 (3d ed. 1971).
57. Another possible consequence is disqualification from § 931 status of a corpora-
tion operating at a gross loss. See note 53 supra.
58. IRC § 931(d). The only exception applicable to a corporation is for charitable
contributions. IRC § 931(d)(2)(C).
59. Rev. Rul. 65-293, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 323, 324; I.T. 3791, 1946-1 CuM. BULL. 148,
150; I.T. 3363, 1940-1 CUM. BULL. 92, 93.
60. See Rev. Rul. 65-293, 1965-2 CuM. BULL. 323, revoked by Rev. Rul. 73-498, 1973
INT. REv. BULL. No. 46, at 19.
61. IRC § 1504(b)(4) ("Corporations entitled to the benefits of section 931 . .
62. See I.T. 3363, 1940-1 CuM. BULL. 92, 93. The language construed by the 1940
ruling was contained in the predecessor of § 931, but is identical with the present
phrase, "entitled to the benefits of this section." IRC § 931(d)(1).
63. See Rev. Rul. 65-293, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 323. For a criticism of this position see
Note, Consolidating the Loss Operations of Domestic Corporations Operating in United
States Possessions, 56 VA. L. REV. 504, 514-27 (1970).
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provisions of the Code, 4 or to their effect on the amount of the
corporation's earnings and profits potentially taxable as dividends
when distributed to its corporate shareholder. 0 In Burke Concrete
Accessories, Inc. v. Commissioner0 the Tax Court rejected the po-
sition of the Service regarding the availability of the consolidated
return privilege and held that an affiliated group included an other-
wise eligible possessions corporation with net losses, since the cor-
poration derived no "benefits" from its qualification under § 931.
67
The Service recently agreed to follow Burke and thus exacerbated
the asymmetry created by its prior ruling that § 931 qualification was
elective only as to treatment of the possessions corporation. 8 Thus,
if a corporation entitled to the benefits of § 931 has net income,
that income is not subject to United States tax (if the corporation
elects § 931 treatment), whereas if such a corporation has a net loss,
that loss may be used to offset taxable income of other corporations
in a consolidated group.
(ii). China Trade Act Corporation
A corporation organized under the China Trade Act of 1922,60
and owned by United States citizens or residents of Formosa, Hong
Kong, the United States, or its possessions is, in effect, exempt from
tax on income from sources within Formosa and Hong Kong under
§ 941.70 Because of the fact that only four China Trade Act cor-
64. IRC § 172.
65. IRC §§ 301, 316(a).
66. 56 T.C. 588 (1971), appeal dismissed, P-H 1971 FaD. TAxES 61,000, 5A CCH 1973
STAND. FED. TAx REP. 4903.73 (9th Cir. 1971).
67. The, implications of Burke extend beyond the treatment of losses and may permit
any accumulated earnings and profits of the loss corporation to be paid tax-free to the
shareholder, see Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-14(a)(1) (1966), and IRC §§ 243, 246(a)(2)(B). It
is therefore not surprising that Congress has already proposed legislation clarifying
the elective nature of section 931 status and curtailing the consolidated return dividend
exclusion by denying the dividends-received deduction for dividends "out of earnings
and profits of a corporation attributable to amounts excluded from the gross income
of such corporation under section 931," H.R. 11148, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1972).
See H.R. REP. No. 92-1300, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1972).
68. See Rev. Rul. 73-498, 1973 INT. REV. BULL. No. 46, at 19, revoking Rev. Rul.
65-293, 1965-2 Cus. BuLL. 323. Rev. Rul. 65-293, while denying the consolidated return
privilege to a possessions corporation operating at a loss, did allow the corporation to
elect out of § 931 treatment in filing its own tax return. This elective feature was
asymmetrical. If the corporation had net income one year, it could escape United
States taxation by electing § 931 treatment. If it had a net loss, it could refuse to elect
§ 931 treatment, deduct the loss on its return without regard to the deduction limit
imposed by § 931 and, if necessary, carry the loss forward to offset subsequent taxable
income. This subsequent income could then, of course, be earned without regard to
the source restrictions of § 931.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970).
70. Section 941(a) allows the corporation a deduction for the proportion of its
taxable income from Formosa and Hong Kong sources which the stock owned by the
persons enumerated in the text bears to the total outstanding stock.
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porations are currently active, 71 any arguable asymmetries in the
treatment of foreign gain and loss by § 941 are of trivial importance.
(iii). DISC
To qualify as a DISC a domestic corporation72 must have "nomi-
nal" capitalization of at least $2,500, 73 satisfy an "export receipts"
test 74 and an "export assets" test,75 and elect to be treated as a DISC.
6
A DISC is not subject to income tax.77 Instead, the DISC's sharehold-
ers pay tax on about one-half of its earnings currently 8 and on the
remainder of the earnings when they are distributed, 9 when the
shareholder disposes of his stock,80 or when the corporation ceases
to qualify as a DISC."' The effect is to defer the imposition of in-
come tax on approximately one-half of the DISC's income, an effect
consciously designed to promote export-related activities and invest-
ments which satisfy the receipts and assets tests.s2
In the most unlikely event that a DISC has a loss year,83 the
deficit first reduces "other earnings and profits" of the DISC, 4 then
"accumulated DISC income,"8 5 and finally "previously taxed in-
come."8' 6 Since the first two categories of earnings are taxable to
the shareholder if distributed8 7 while the last category is not,88 the
effect of the loss is to reduce potentially taxable amounts dollar-
for-dollar. A DISC is not eligible to join in filing a consolidated
71. 5 CCH 1973 STAND. FFD. TAX REP. 4,377.01.
72. IRC § 992(a).
73. IRC § 992 (a)(1)(C).
74. IRC § 992(a)(1)(A).
75. IRC § 992(a)(l)(B).
76. IRO § 992(a)(1)(D).
77. IRC § 991.
78. IRC §§ 995(b)(1), 996(f)(2).
79. IRC § 996(f)(1); cf. IRC § 996(a)(3).
80. IRC § 995(c).
81. IRC § 995(b)(2).
82. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 92-437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1971).
83. Section 994. permits a DISC and a controlling shareholder which is a "related
supplier" to avoid the rigors of § 482 and use mechanical "safe haven" rules for
pricing intercompany sales, commissions, and rentals. Apart from any profit justifiable
under § 482, the pricing rules permit the DISC to earn a net profit equal to the
greater of 4 percent of its gross receipts, IRC § 994(a)(1), or 50 percent of the combined
taxable income of the DISC and the related supplier, IRC § 994(a)(2). Although the
proposed regulations, in a dubious bit of statutory reconstruction, generally provide
that these pricing rules do not apply to the extent that they would cause the related
supplier to realize a loss on any transaction, see proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.994-1(e)(1),
37 Fed. Reg. 19627 (1972), they specifically and in all events permit the related sup-
plier to reimburse the DISC for any losses which the DISC would otherwise suffer, pro-
posed Treas. Reg. § 1.994-1(e)(1)(i), 37 Fed. Reg. 19627 (1972).
84. IRC § 996(b)(1).
85. IRC § 996(b)(2).
86. IRC § 996(b)(3).
87. IRC §§ 301, 316(a).
88. IRC § 996(a)(3).
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return"9 and cannot otherwise make its losses currently available to
offset income of its shareholder. Since a loss year for such a corpora-
tion is highly improbable, the symmetry implications of DISC loss
treatment will not be discussed in this article.
(iv). Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation
A Western Hemisphere trade corporation (WHTC) is a domestic
corporation9 ° which conducts all of its business (except for "inci-
dental""' purchases) in countries in North, Central, or South America,
or in the West Indies.92 Once qualified, a WHTC may reduce its
entire taxable income, regardless of source, by a special deduction
which lowers the top corporate tax rate by 14 percentage points-
from 48 percent to 34 percent at-1973 rates.9 3
Even though profits are thus taxed at a reduced rate, losses may
directly offset, dollar-for-dollar, the taxable income of related cor-
porations filing a consolidated return, since the definition of an
affiliated group includes WHTC's.9 4 In the absence of a consoli-
89. IRC § 1504(b)(2).
90. IRC § 921.
91. The regulations define "incidental" as "minor" or "nonrecurring or unusual in
character" rather than as "incident to" the business of the corporation. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.921-1(a)(1) (1957). See Otis Elevator Co. v. United States, 356 F.2d 157 (Ct. Cl. 1966)
(16.9 percent permissible); Topps of Canada, Ltd., 36 T.C. 326 (1961) (34 percent non-
Western Hemisphere purchases too high).
92. The corporation must do its business "within" the countries, not on the high
seas, Rev. Rul. 66-340, 1966-2 Cus. BULL. 283, and perhaps not on land not subject
to the sovereignty of any nation, such as Antarctica. Cf. Rev. Rul. 67-52, 1967-1 Cum.
BULL. 186; Treas. Reg. § 1.911-2(f) (1963). Rev. Rul. 55-105, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 94, lists
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the Bahamas as qualifying countries, but not
Bermuda and the Falkland Islands. The corporation must derive at least 95 percent
of its gross income from foreign sources for the three-year period preceding the close
of the taxable year. IRC § 921(1). Rev. Rul. 56-316, 1956-2 Cums. BULL. 597, holds that
a corporation must have gross income to meet this test, so that a corporation with a
"gross loss" (gross receipts minus cost of goods sold) would not qualify as a WHTC.
The regular source rules of §§ 861-63 determine source of income for this purpose.
Treas. Reg. § 1.921-1(c) (1957). Accordingly, a corporation engaged in the purchase
and resale of goods can meet this test merely by arranging for title to the goods to
pass outside the United States, IRC § 862(a)(6); Rev. Rul. 64-198, 1964-2 Cum. BULL.
189. To qualify for WHTC treatment, a corporation must also derive at least 90
percent of its gross income during the same three-year period from the "active" conduct
of a trade or business. IRC § 921(2). It is clear that a relatively inactive export op-
eration can meet this test. See A.P. Green Export Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 383
(Ct. Cl. 1960).
93. IRC § 922 defines the amount of the special deduction as the corporation's tax-
able income (computed without regard to the special deductions) multiplied by a frac-
tion whose numerator is 14 percent and whose denominator is the sum of the normal
and surtax rates in IRC § 11 for the year. At 1973 rates, the fraction is 14/48ths [14%/
(22%+26%)]. It is not clear whether this unique deduction has the effect of re-
ducing the earnings and profits of the WHTC for purposes of determining the extent
to which distributions therefrom are taxable as "dividends." For analogies, see B.
BirKE & J. EusricE, supra note 56, at 7-17.
94. IRC § 1504(b). Cf. IRC § 1503(b) (special rule for application of overall foreign
tax credit limitation where affiliated group includes "one or more Western Hemisphere
trade corporations").
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dated return election, the losses may be carried over to reduce the
corporation's taxable income in other years9" or may reduce the
corporation's earnings and profits which will be taxed when dis-
tributed.96
The asymmetry is obvious: While the Code subjects the taxable in-
come of a WHTC to a maximum tax rate 14 percentage points below
the top corporate rate, it does not similarly restrict the use of WHTC
losses.
c. Foreign Subsidiary Corporations
Foreign corporations are taxed on business income only to the
extent that it is "effectively connected" with the conduct of a trade
or business within the United States97 and on certain other income
only to the extent that it is "from sources within the United States."' 8
Where a foreign corporation has operating losses, the Code generally
allows only those deductions "connected with income which is effec-
tively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the
United States."9 9 The regulations provide a system of allocation de-
signed to make the difficult but necessary determinations of what
constitutes a "connection."'' 00 But this problem is of only minor
significance for present purposes, since it is generally not economical
for a United States investor to form a foreign subsidiary to engage
in business in or invest in the United States.' 0 ' The principal tax
95. IRC § 172. Use of a loss as a carryover to years in which the corporation quali-
fies as a WHTC will offset income otherwise taxable at a reduced rate, and thus not
be so advantageous as use of the losses currently by other corporations filing a con-
solidated return.
96. IRC §§ 501, 316(a). Since a corporate shareholder may exclude from taxable
income at least 85 percent, IRC § 243(a)(1), and as much as 100 percent, IRC § 243(a)(3)
& Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-14(a)(1) (1966), of dividends from a WHTC, this use of losses
is less advantageous than their application as carryovers.
97. Section 882(a)(1) imposes tax at the regular corporate rates on the net taxable
income of this description. Sections 864(b) and (c) define "trade or business within
the United States" and "effectively connected," respectively. See generally S. ROBERTS
& W. WARREN, U.S. INCOME TAXATION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS AND NONRESIDENT ALIENS
chs. V-VB (1966).
98. Section 881(a) imposes a 30 percent tax on the gross income received from United
States sources as "interest, dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, com-
pensations, remunerations, emoluments, and other fixed or determinable annual or
periodical gains, profits and income," and gains on certain sales or exchanges of
property. Bilateral income tax conventions to which the United States is a party often
reduce or eliminate the 30 percent rate on some categories of income. See, e.g., Con-
vention with The Netherlands on Double Taxation and Taxes on Income, April 29,
1948, arts. VII, VIII, IX, 62 Stat. 1757 (1948), T.I.A.S. No. 1855.
99. IRC § 882(c)(1)(A).
100. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.882-3(b)(2), 1.873-1(a)(1) (1957). The differences between these
regulations and the recently proposed regulations (prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8, 38 Fed.
Reg. 15840, June 18, 1973) covering the converse situation, allocation of expenses of a
domestic corporation to its foreign income, are one tantalizing aspect of this problem.
101. A corporate investor would not receive a credit for United States income tax
paid by the subsidiary. IRC § 901(b).
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attraction of a foreign corporation for a United States person is its
use as a vehicle for foreign business activity.
(i). "Deferral" of Loss as Well as Gain
The income of a foreign corporation not engaged in business or
investment in the United States and not deriving income from
sources therein is generally' 02 not subject to United States income
tax' 03 until it is distributed to a United States shareholder as a divi-
dend104 or, in certain cases, upon the United States shareholder's
sale or exchange of the stock at a gain.1 5 When the earnings of the
foreign corporation are thus repatriated to or realized by a corporate
investor, the United States tax is offset dollar-for-dollar by the
foreign income taxes paid on the earnings under the "indirect"
foreign tax credit provisions of the Code, up to the limit imposed
by § 904.10
The Code deals with losses of a foreign corporation in a rather
symmetrical fashion. Except to the extent of the possibility of off-
setting a foreign corporation's losses against its own United States
income, 10 7 a United States shareholder cannot use the foreign cor-
poration's current operating losses to offset directly other income
subject to United States tax,108 although such losses will reduce the
amount of the earnings and profits of the foreign corporation'0 9 and,
thereby, may reduce the amount ultimately taxable as a dividend"O'
to the United States shareholder. The statute specifically excludes
foreign corporations from membership in an affiliated group eligible
to file a consolidated return."1
102. The principal exceptions arc foreign corporations with "tainted" income or
assets caught by the foreign personal holding company, IRO §§ 551-58, or subpart F,
IRC §§ 951-64, provisions. See pp. 330-34 infra.
103. IRC §§ 11(f), 881-82.
104. IRC §§ 11(a), 61(a)(7).
105. IRC § 1248(a).
106. IRC §§ 902, 960.
107. As net operating loss carryovers under § 172 or as deductions allocated in part
to United States income under § 882(c)(1)(A).
108. IRC § 882(c)(I)(A). Rev. Rul. 73-226, 1973-21 INT. REv. BULL. 7, identifies a
%cry narrow area in which a domestic parent corporation might obtain a current
ordinary deduction for losses of a foreign subsidiary corporation. Where the parent
made payments to creditors of its subsidiary, who were also customers of the parent,
"[s]olely to prevent damage to the [parent's] existing goodwill," the payments were
deductible by the parent as ordinary and necessary business expenses under § 162.
109. Taxable income, positive or negative, is the starting point for computation of
the earnings and profits of a corporation, including a foreign corporation. See generally
B. BITrER & J. E-USrICE, supra note 56, at 7.03-04; cf. IRC § 964(a); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.964-1 (1964).
110. See IRC §§ 301, 316(a), 1248(a).
111. IRc § 1504(b)(3).
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(ii). Timing of Formation
The fact that losses of a foreign branch may be used to reduce
directly other United States income of a domestic corporation," 2
while losses of a foreign corporation may not be so used, reflects
an underlying asymmetry which may affect a United States inves-
tor's strategy in planning foreign operations. A domestic corpora-
tion which plans a foreign venture expected to lose money during
its start-up period may operate the venture as a branch for the
initial period, deducting the losses currently, and then incorporate
the venture abroad when it has turned the corner and begun to
generate profits. No legislative or judicial doctrine appears to re-
quire "recapture" of the losses in the way the depreciation recap-
ture provisions" 3  and the "tax benefit rule""14 operate in other
contexts, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue apparently does
not take such start-up losses into account in issuing the rulings un-
der § 367 which are a prerequisite to tax-free incorporation of a
foreign subsidiary."n 5
It is doubtful that the courts and the Commissioner have the
ability to stop this practice under existing law. 10 Neither § 367 nor
§ 269,117 both of which would require a showing of a tax avoidance
112. See pp. 317-18 supra.
113. IRC §§ 1245, 1250.
114. See Commissioner v. Anders, 414 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
958 (1969); cf. IRC § 111; Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943). But cf. Nash
v. United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970).
115. See Rev. Proc. 68-23, § 3.02, 1968-1 Cum. BULL. 821. Under IRC § 367, a foreign
corporation may not be treated as a corporation for purposes of the roles providing
for nonrecognition of gain in incorporation, reorganization, and liquidation transactions,
unless prior to the transaction the Secretary of the Treasury determines that it is not
in pursuance of a plan having the avoidance of federal income taxes as a principal
purpose. Thus, a domestic corporation's transfer of appreciated property to an 80
percent or more owned foreign subsidiary in exchange for stock of the subsidiary
would require an advance ruling from the Internal Revenue Service to avoid recog-
nition of the gain. Similarly, the domestic corporation could not liquidate such a sub-
sidiary and avoid recognition of gain on the liquidation absent an advance ruling
under § 367.
116. The asymmetry occurs only if events occurring in two or more taxable years
are considered and thus might be said to be merely a concomitant of the well estab-
lished "annual accounting" principle of the Code. See IRC § 441(a); United States v.
Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951). If this is so, the practice may well be beyond the reach
of present law. The administration's proposal, as part of the Trade Bill of 1973, to
require "recapture" of foreign startup losses, tends to confirm this conclusion. See De-
partment of the Treasury, Proposals for Tax Change, April 30, 1973, at 171.
117. IRC § 269(a) permits the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate to disallow
deductions, credits, and other allowances where a shareholder seeks to secure such on
the formation of a 50 percent or more controlled corporation, if the principal pur-
pose of the transaction is evasion or avoidance of federal income tax. Mere incor-
poration of an international business venture has been held to be outside the scope
of § 269, see Siegel, 45 T.C. 566 (1966), acquiescence, 1966-2 Cum. BULL. 7, and the
Service does not seem to press the application of § 269 in this context. Cf. Rev. Rul.
70-238, 1970-1 Cum. BULL. 61 (§ 269 is inapplicable to formation of a domestic cor-
poration for purpose of securing the benefits of the Western Hemisphere trade cor-
poration provisions).
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purpose for the incorporation transaction, appears to apply, since
any tax avoidance takes place prior to the incorporation transaction.
Thus, an asymmetry results from a taxpayer's ability both to obtain
deductible losses during unprofitable start-up years and to shield
income in subsequent years from United States taxation.
(iii). Contiguous Country Subsidiaries
One exception to the general treatment of a foreign corporation
is that § 1504(d) permits a domestic corporation owning all the stock
of a corporation formed in a country contiguous to the United
States (i.e., Canada or Mexico) to elect to treat the corporation as a
domestic corporation for purposes of the income tax law, including
the consolidated return provisions, if the corporation can be shown
to be organized and maintained solely for the purpose of complying
with the laws of the foreign country as to title and operation of
property. 118 The effect of such an election on the treatment of losses
of the foreign corporation is the nearly perfect symmetry described
in the previous discussion of foreign branches.
A different situation may obtain, however, where an electing con-
tiguous country corporation suffers losses in one year and expects
profits in the following year. The question arises whether the elec-
tion under § 1504(d) can be rescinded in order to defer the United
States tax on the profits. Although the statute and the consolidated
return regulations suggest no reason why the option to be treated
as a domestic corporation is not a two-way street for the taxpayer,
the reorganization branch of the Internal Revenue Service views the
election of domestic corporation status as equivalent to the liquida-
tion of the foreign corporation.1 19 The Service may also view the "de-
election" of a contiguous country corporation as equivalent to an
incorporation transaction under § 351, gain on which would be tax-
free only if an advance ruling under § 367 were secured. 20 Even
118. IRC - 1504(d). The qualification rules are strictly construed and thus present
definitional problems. Rev. Rul. 71-523, 1971-2 Cus. BULL. 326, holds that a foreign cor-
poration used to obtain the benefits of a foreign grant program restricted to corporations
organized under laws of that country does not qualify.
119. The IRS apparently views an election under § 1504(d) as involving a transfer
of assets from a foreign corporation to a domestic corporation, a transaction which
would require an advance ruling under §§ 367, 368(a)(1)(D) in order to avoid recognition
of any gain as a tax-free reorganization. See F. PEEL, CONSOLIDATED TAX RETURNS § 3.03
(2d ed. 1973); 25 Tx Lxw. 566 (1972).
120. It is not known whether the Service would attempt in this fashion to forestall
use of a contiguous country subsidiary's startup losses through a § 1504(d) election,
which the parent corporation would presumably revoke when the subsidiary became
profitable. Though the Service is understood to view termination of § 1504(d) status
as a § 351 transaction, see note 119 supra, § 367 may simply not prohibit such trans-
actions. See p. 328 supra. This problem may not be as significant as the election
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so, the Service may well view itself as powerless to prevent the
change back to foreign corporation status in situations designed to
avoid current United States tax on expected earnings, or to attach
conditions of "recapture" or other penalties to any § 367 ruling.1 21
The potential asymmetry thus results from the ability to utilize losses
in unprofitable years to offset other United States taxable income
while deferring United States taxation of income in profitable years.
(iv). Subpart F
In terms of the number of foreign corporations affected, subpart
F of the Code12 2 contains even more important exceptions to the
above-described general treatment of profits and losses of foreign
corporations. "Subpart F income"'12 3 of a controlled foreign corpora-
tion 12 4 includes specified kinds of income from sales of goods be-
tween related persons,"2a income from the performance of specified
services for related persons, 126 passive investment income, 27 and in-
come from the insurance of United States risks.12 8 Such income is
taxed to United States shareholders"'" as it is earned, 130 without
regard to whether it is distributed.' 3t The amount of income so
taxed is limited, however, to the earnings and profits of the con-
situation with respect to an existing subsidiary, since the stock of a newly-formed loss
corporation is likely not to have appreciated substantially in value by the time its
business begins to show a profit.
121. See p. 328 supra. In cases in which the losses of the subsidiary have ex-
ceeded the parent company's investment therein, the "excess loss" provisions of the
consolidated return regulations may help to reduce the tax avoidance possibilities. The
consolidated return regulations define "excess losses" to include losses of a subsidiary
which exceed the parent corporation's investment therein and require such losses to
be added to the parent's income whenever the investment in the subsidiary is "dis-
posed of." Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-19 (1966).
122. IRC §§ 951-64.
123. "Subpart F income" is defined in IRC § 952(a) to include the items enumerated
in the text and extended by IRC § 954(b)(3) to include all of a corporation's gross
income where more than 70 percent of the corporation's gross income would otherwise
be subpart F income.
124. Defined by IRC § 957(a), with certain exceptions, as a foreign corporation of
which more than 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock
entitled to vote is owned (after application of the attribution rules of §§ 958(a)-(b))
by United States shareholders on any day during the taxable year of the foreign
corporation.
125. "Foreign base company sales income," IRC §§ 952(a)(2), 954(a)(2), 954(d).
126. "Foreign base company services income:' IRC §§ 952(a)(2), 954(a)(3), 954(e).
127. "Foreign personal holding company income," IRC §§ 952(a)(2), 954(a)(1), 954(c).
128. IRC §§ 952(a)(1), 953.
129. Defined by IRC §§ 951(b), 957(d) and 7701(a)(30) to include, with certain
exceptions, United States citizens, residents, partnerships, corporations, trusts, and
estates owning (after application of the attribution rules of §§ 958(a)-(b)) 10 percent
or more of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote
of a foreign corporation.
130. IRC § 951(a)(1)(A).
131. Distributions (or investments in United States property) of amounts previously
taxed are not includable in the shareholder's gross income. IRC § 959(a).
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trolled foreign corporation for the current year. 132 In addition, cer-
tain amounts invested in "United States property"'133 by a controlled
foreign corporation are taxed as constructive dividends to United
States shareholders.1
3 4
Current losses of a controlled foreign corporation affect the amount
of any "minimum distribution" which the United States shareholder
chooses to receive in order to avoid having to include in its own
income the foreign corporation's subpart F income.135 The amount
of the minimum required distribution is inversely proportional to
the effective foreign tax rate of the foreign corporation136-the ratio
of the foreign taxes paid by the foreign corporation for the year to
its pre-tax earnings and profits for the year.137 Moreover, where the
United States shareholder makes a chain 38 or group"3 9 minimum
distribution election-in effect combining the foreign taxes and earn-
ings and profits of several related foreign corporations to arrive at
a single consolidated effective foreign tax rate 40-losses of one of the
132. IRO § 952(c). The amount of current earnings and profits is reduced by
deficits in earnings and profits of the controlled foreign corporation, id., or certain
related controlled foreign corporations, IRO 952(d), in the same or other years.
Because of the current earnings and profits ceiling, current losses of a controlled
foreign corporation preclude taxation of the shareholder under IRC § 951(a)(l)(A)(i).
Rules for determination of the earnings and profits of a controlled foreign corporation
for purposes of subpart F are set out in Treas. Reg. § 1.964-1 (1964). The regulations
provide detailed instructions for translating foreign currency financial statements of
the corporation into United States dollar statements consistent with generally accepted
financial and tax accounting principles in the United States.
133. IRC § 956 defines the taxable amount as the increased investment, measured
from year-end to year-end, in tangible property located in the United States, intangibles
such as patents and copyrights acquired or developed for use in the United States,
and stock and debt obligations of United States persons.
134. IRC § 951(a)(1)(B). Amounts taxed under this section may be excluded from
gross income when distributed to the United States shareholder, or, apparently, when
reinvested in United States property. IRC § 959(a)(2).
While the United States property provisions, unlike the provisions limiting the
taxation of subpart F income to the amount of the controlled foreign corporation's
current earnings, purport to subject all accumulated and current earnings of the
corporation to tax, see IRC § 956(a)(1), the opinion in Estate of Leonard E. Whitlock,
59 T.C. 490, 508-09 (1972) (dictum), appeal docketed, 10th Cir., May 25, 1973, casts
doubt on the constitutionality, under Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), of tax-
ing accumulated, as opposed to current, earnings thereunder. Under this view current
losses of a controlled foreign corporation would preclude taxation of the shareholder
under § 951(a)(1)(B). But see Dougherty, 7 CCH 1973 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 7538
(1973) (it is constitutional to tax accumulated earnings from years prior to enactment
of subpart F).
135. Section 963 allows a domestic shareholder to exclude its share of the subpart F
income of its controlled foreign corporations by electing to have them distribute a
certain percentage of their earnings and profits for the current year. IRC §§ 951(a)(1)(A)
(i), 963(a). The election may be made with respect to a single controlled foreign corpora-
tion or chains or groups of controlled foreign corporations.
136. IRC § 963(b).
137. IRC § 963(d).
138. IRC § 963(c)(2).
139. IRC § 963(c)(3).
140. IRC § 963(d)(2).
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corporations may be used to reduce the earnings and profits of other
corporations in the chain or group.14 1 This will reduce the size of
the required minimum distribution.
While the Code provides for the inclusion of subpart F income
in the gross income of a United States shareholder, it is asymmetrical
in failing to permit the direct deduction by the shareholder of any
net losses of the controlled foreign corporation.1 42
Another potential asymmetry results from the possible effects of
losses of a foreign subsidiary on the minimum distribution compu-
tation with respect to the controlled foreign corporation itself for
years other than the loss year. The principal question is whether
a current foreign loss will reduce earnings and profits of any year
other than the year of loss. A related question is whether, if the loss
produces tax benefits with respect to some other year under the ap-
plicable foreign tax law (such as a loss carryback producing a refund
of taxes paid in an earlier year), the amount of the tax benefit will
affect the amount of the "taxes paid"'143 by the foreign corporation
for the earlier year or, at least, the earnings and profits144 of either
the current or the prior year.1
45
141. Treas. Reg. § 1.963-2(d)(3) (1964).
142. It is conceivable that the subpart F provisions could be read to permit such
direct deduction. IRC § 951(a)(1)(A)(i) requires inclusion in gross income, in the absence
of a minimum distribution, of a United States shareholder's pro rata share of a
controlled foreign corporation's subpart F income. The latter amount is defined in
§ 951(a)(2) as the amount which the shareholder would have received in a pro rata
distribution of the corporation's subpart F income-pro rata with time as well as stock
ownership dimensions. Section 952(c) limits the subpart F income of a controlled foreign
corporation to its earnings and profits for the year, an amount which can, quite
clearly, be negative. Section 952(a)(2) includes "foreign base company income" in "sub-
part F income." Section 954(a) defines the former term, and § 954(b)(5) specifically
provides that deductions properly allocable to foreign base company income shall be
taken into account. There are two obstacles to the direct deduction of "deficits"
(foreign base company income exceeded by deductions properly allocable thereto) un-
der this scheme. First, § 951(a)(2) might be read to preclude the distribution of a
negative sum. Second, § 961, which explicitly provides only for upward adjustments
to stock basis for the amount of subpart F income imputed and included, might be
read to preclude downward adjustments by addition of a negative amount.
Since the function of § 951(a)(2) is simply to define "pro rata share," it may well
be logical to recognize a hypothetical negative distribution for this purpose, or at
least not to require application of § 951(a)(2) at all in the case of a 100 percent con-
trolled subsidiary whose ownership is unchanged throughout the taxable year. The
regulations and the legislative history are completely silent as to this possibility. See
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.951-1 (1965); H.R. REm,. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 57-66 (1962);
S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 78-94, 237-79 (1962); H.R. R1m'. No. 2508, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 29-36 (Conf. Report 1962).
143. Foreign "taxes paid" constitute the numerator of the "effective foreign tax
rate" fraction. IRC § 963(d).
144. "Earnings and profits" constitute the denominator of the "effective foreign
tax rate" fraction. Id.
145. The relevant cases and rulings suggest at least three possible outcomes.
The argument that a current foreign loss does not affect the foreign taxes paid
and earnings and profits for any other year is based primarily on Rev. Rul. 64-146,
1964-1 Cum. BULL. 129, which holds that a tax refund arising from a net operating
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If the impact of the foreign loss (and any related refund of foreign
taxes) is not confined to the year of the loss for purposes of the mini-
mum distribution requirement, then the effect would be asymmetrical
since gains realized in that year (and the foreign taxes paid thereon)
would have affected the computation of the minimum distribution
amount only for that year.
Finally, an asymmetry in the treatment of gains and losses in the
foreign currency area may arise under subpart F in relation to the
deemed paid foreign tax credit of § 902. Under the regulations, a
United States corporate shareholder of a foreign subsidiary must
compute the earnings and profits of the subsidiary, for purposes of
computing the § 902 foreign tax credit with respect to dividends
therefrom, under the full subpart F rules, which require unrealized
currency exchange gains and losses to be taken into account, 46 when-
ever the United States shareholder elects the benefits of the minimum
distribution provisions.14 7 In other years for which no minimum dis-
tribution election is made, however, the earnings and profits of the
subsidiary may be computed without regard to unrealized exchange
gains and losses. 148 A United States shareholder wishing to maximize
its indirect foreign tax credits per dollar of dividends received from
loss carryback increases carnings and profits of an accrual basis corporation for the
taxable year in which the right to the refund arises, rather than the earlier year to
which the loss may be carried back. Because only current earnings and profits are
thus affected by the operating loss, it would follow that no adjustment to the amount
of foreign taxes paid in the earlier year is in order, since any such adjustment would
ipso facto affect the earnings and profits of the earlier year.
The second possible outcome of the instant question would be based on Steel Im-
provement & Forge Co., 36 T.C. 265 (1961), rev'd on other grounds, 314 F.2d 96 (6th
Cir. 1963), and Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. United States, 62-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
' 9160, 9 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 483 (W.D. Wash. 1961), which support the proposition
that the amount of foreign taxes paid in the earlier years should be reduced to re-
flect a refund arising in a subsequent year. If this rule is correct, then it would be
necessary to reduce the earnings and profits of the earlier years by the losses carried
back to them in order to coordinate low-tax and low-earnings years in the way
necessary for rational functioning of both the § 902 foreign tax credit and the minimun
distribution provisions. See E. OWENS, supra note 2, at 127-28. One problem with such
an adjustment is, unsurprisingly, Rev. Rul. 64-146, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 129, which holds,
in effect, that a net operating loss does not affect earnings and profits of earlier years.
A third possibility is that the foreign taxes paid by the subsidiary must be reduced
by any amount thereof subsequently refunded, pursuant to Steel Improvement and Pa-
cific Gamble Robinson, but that Rev. Rul. 64-146 and the general treatment of deficits
under subpart F as an annual concept preclude reducing the earnings and profits of
the subsidiary for the earlier year. This would, of course, be the worst outcome pos-
sible for United States shareholders because it would increase the required minimum
distribution with respect to the earlier year, and decrease the § 902 foreign tax credit
allowable with respect to the earlier year, even though the average income and foreign
tax rate of the subsidiary for the current and earlier years would reflect both the
loss and its effect on the subsidiary's foreign tax liability.
146. Treas. Reg. § 1.964-1 (1964).
1417. See generally Ravenscroft, Currency Revaluation and Devaluation-Tax Effects,
supra note 2, at A-13 to 17, A-27 to 28; Treas. Reg. § 1.902-3(c)(5)(ii) (1965).
1,18. Treas. Reg. § 1.902-3(c)(5)(i) (1965).
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a given subsidiary will subject the subsidiary to a minimum distri-
bution election whenever the subsidiary has unrealized exchange losses
and make no minimum distribution election whenever the subsidiary
has unrealized exchange gains. Although separate accounting periods
are necessarily involved, the treatment of currency exchange gains and
losses of a given foreign subsidiary may thus be quite asymmetrical,
with losses recognized and gains unrecognized in the computation of
the denominator of the § 902 foreign tax credit fraction.
B. Terminal Losses
The fact that some foreign losses cannot be used currently to off-
set income of a United States investor underscores the importance of
the treatment accorded foreign terminal losses.
1. Citizens and Domestic Corporations
Upon termination of business operations abroad a United States
citizen conducting the business as a sole proprietor and a domestic
corporation with a foreign branch will generally realize capital gain
on a sale or exchange of real or depreciable property used in the
trade or business, but an ordinary loss on such dispositions of the
property. 4 9 This asymmetrical treatment of gains and losses on prop-
erty used in the trade or business applies equally in the domestic
context.
If the United States investor conducts the foreign business through
a separate domestic corporation, the various possibilities of termina-
tion transactions at the shareholder level include sale, liquidation,
reorganization, worthlessness, or expropriation. Some of these will
result in nonrecognition of gain or loss.',5 The factors which in-
fluence choice of termination method apply equally in the domestic
context, with one exception: Expropriation of the stock of a domestic
corporation is treated as an involuntary conversion of the stock cer-
tificates producing ordinary loss treatment? 51
149. IRC § 1231(a). Gains and losses on sales or exchanges of inventory and accounts
receivable will generally be ordinary in character. See IRC §§ 1221(1), (4). Gains and
losses with respect to sales or exchanges of other assets will generally be capital. See
IRC § 1221. Other losses incurred in the trade or business, such as expropriation
losses, will be ordinary in character. See IRC §§ 165(a), 1231(a); Rev. Rul. 72-1, 1972-1
GUM. BULL. 52.
150. See, e.g., IRC §§ 332, 354, 368(a).
151. IRC § 165(a); Rev. Rul. 72-1, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 52. It should be noted that,
iii the unlikely event that gain was realized on the involuntary conversion, § 1033(a)
would permit deferral of recognition of the gain to the extent similar property is re-
ceived or purchased with the proceeds of the conversion. The tax treatment of na-
tionalization of a subsidiary is thus asymmetrical and advantageous to United States
investors whether gain or loss is realized on the nationalization. This situation is
334
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2. Foreign Corporations
Where the chosen investment vehicle is a foreign corporation sever-
al special considerations may enter the picture upon termination of
the investment.
a. Section 1248
Gain on the sale or exchange of stock of a controlled foreign cor-
poration by a United States shareholder is taxed as a dividend under
§ 1248, rather than as a capital gain, to the extent of the earnings
and profits accumulated while the shareholder owned the stock.'5 2
The Internal Revenue Service has adopted this constructive dividend
as the measure of tax avoidance in certain reorganizations involving
foreign corporations and imposes inclusion of the dividend in a share-
holder's income as the "tollcharge" for the advance ruling under § 367
required for nonrecognition treatment of any additional gain on the
transaction.1
3
Disposition of stock of a controlled foreign corporation at a loss,
however, precludes the application of § 1248 by its own terms or as
the "tollcharge" measure for a § 367 ruling.15 4
Termination of a United States shareholder's interest in a foreign
corporation in a complete liquidation will have much the same ef-
fect as a sale or exchange. If, on the one hand, the United States
shareholder controls' 55 the foreign corporation and the transaction*
meets the other requirements of § 332, gain will not be recognized
if the shareholder secures an advance ruling under § 367 on the trans-
action. 151 If there is a loss, no § 367 ruling is required,157 and the
loss will not be recognized.158
most relevant to current developments. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1973, § 1, at 1,
col. 5 (Libyan seizure of oil companies).
152. IRC § 1248(a). Two important exceptions exclude earnings accumulated while
the corporation was a less developed country corporation and earnings previously taxed
to the United States shareholder under § 951. IRC § 1248(d). See generally Gifford,
Controlled Foreign Corporations-Section 1248, TAx MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO No. 240
(1970); Irell & Stone, Understanding Section 1248-The New Tax Law Regarding Sales
or Liquidations of Foreign Corporations, 1964 S. CAL. TAX INST. 321.
153. Rev. Proc. 68-23, § 3.03, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 821.
154. Section 1248(a) limits its application to recognized "gains." Similarly, Rev. Proc.
68-23, §§ 3.03(1)(b), (f, (g), 4.01, limit the toll charge to the amount taxable as a
dividend in a transaction subject to § 1248(a). See note 115 supra.
155. "Control" here means 80 percent stock ownership. IRC § 368(c).
156. IRC §§ 332, 367(a). Rev. Proc. 68-23, § 3.01(1), 1968-1 Cust. BULL. 821 provides
that the "tolIcharge" for a § 367 ruling on liquidation of a foreign subsidiary of a
domestic corporation is inclusion in income as a dividend of all earnings and profits
of the foreign corporation properly attributable to the parent's stock in the cor-
poration.
157. Section 367(a) is limited by its terms to transactions involving "gain" ("In
determining the extent to which gain shall be recognized ... ".
158. IRC § 332(a). Where loss realized upon such a liquidation reflects operat-
ing losses, they may not qualify for carryover treatment. Section 381(c)(1) per-
335
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If the liquidation is "taxable" and subject to § 331, on the other
hand, any gain or loss will be recognized. 150 A gain will be taxed as
a dividend to the extent of the earnings and profits yardstick of
§ 124810 and as capital gain to any remaining extent. 10' A loss, how-
ever, will normally be capital in character' 62 since, again, § 1248
will not apply to a liquidation in which loss is recognized. 1 3
Section 1248 thus creates an asymmetry in that it requires that
gains on the sale or exchange of stock of a controlled foreign cor-
poration or on the taxable liquidation thereof be taxed as ordinary
income to the extent of the earnings and profits of the corporation,
but does not allow losses resulting from such transactions to be
treated as ordinary in character, even though there may be a deficit
in the earnings and profits account of the controlled foreign cor-
poration.
The detrimental effect of this asymmetry on a shareholder dispos-
ing of such a corporation at a loss is somewhat mitigated by the
availability of ordinary loss treatment in two situations. First, as in
the case of a domestic subsidiary, a United States shareholder which
owns at least 80 percent of the stock of an insolvent foreign cor-
poration may be able to obtain an ordinary loss deduction with
respect to the presumably worthless stock.0 4 Second, ordinary loss
treatment may be available if the loss occurs through expropriation.' 01
mits the carryover of net operating losses in distributions to which § 332 applies. But
net operating losses are defined under § 172 as the "excess of the deductions allowed
by this chapter over the gross income." In the case of a foreign corporation, § 882(c)
restricts deductions allowed to those properly allocable to income effectively connected
with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States. If the corporation
was not engaged in a trade or business in the United States, it would not have any
deductions allowable under the chapter. See Rev. Rul. 72-421, 1972-2 Cum. BULL. 166.
159. IRC § 331(a).
160. IRO § 1248(a).
161. See IRC § 1221.
162. See IRC § 1221.
163. IRC § 1248(a).
164. IRO § 165(g)(3).
165. The 'expropriation may take the form of a seizure of the stock. The Internal
Revenue Service views nationalization of a corporation formed under the laws of the
expropriating country as confiscation of the stock certificates of the corporation. See
Rev. Rul. 72-1, 1972-1 Cums. BULL. 52. Expropriation may also take the form of a seizure
of assets. Variations on these two modes of expropriation arise in situations in which
the expropriating country ostensibly compensates the taxpayer for the seizure-perhaps
with blocked currency, long-term obligations bearing little interest, or setoffs of tax
assessments of doubtful validity for earlier years-raising difficult questions as to the
amount or timing of the loss. See generally Peel, supra note 2.
An expropriation loss will normally present the same tax issues as the other types
of terminal losses considered herein. If the expropriation takes the form of a na-
tionalization of the United States shareholder's stock interest, the loss will be deductible
under § 165(a), which allows a deduction for losses not compensated by insurance or
otherwise. The transaction is treated as an involuntary conversion of the stock and
is subject to § 1231. If the loss exceeds the United States shareholder's § 1231 gains for
the year, it will produce an ordinary loss. See IRC § 1231(a); Garrigo v. United States,
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b. Source of Gain or Loss
A second asymmetry in this context results from the manner
in which the source of terminal loss is determined. The source rules
of the Code and present regulations provide that the source of gain
on the sale (and, presumably, exchange, liquidation, or other dis-
position) of stock of a foreign corporation is determined solely by
the place of the sale, but the rules do not explicitly provide for
the treatment of losses. Under the regulations 10 0 such losses must
be allocated to a taxpayer's other income from sources within and
sources without the United States on a gross income basis, if no
more appropriate basis of apportionment is available. This approach
is asymmetrical in that it fails to provide a means for independently
determining the source of terminal losses, while providing such a
means with respect to terminal gains. 167
C. Indirect Effects of Losses on the Foreign Tax Credit
In addition to the above-described direct effects of foreign losses
on the tax liability of United States persons, foreign losses may in-
directly affect liability for United States tax in an asymmetrical
fashion through their impact on the foreign tax credit.
The most mechanical indirect effect of a foreign loss arises under
296 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Tex. 1968). The Internal Revenue Service will apparently dis-
regard a forced "sale" of shares pursuant to a foreign expropriation decree, and will
treat any payment received as compensation in connection with the involuntary con-
version, thus preserving the prospect of ordinary loss treatment. See Rev. Rul. 72-1,
1972-1 Cuvm. BULL. 52.
Where the expropriating country seizes the assets of the corporation rather than the
stock, the analysis becomes somewhat more complex. The expropriation would clearly
constitute an involuntary conversion, producing a § 1231 loss potentially ordinary in
character if a domestic corporation were involved. See IRC § 1231(a). The loss of the
foreign corporation will not necessarily produce an ordinary loss or similar tax benefits
to the United States investor, howeier. The ordinary loss will have the effects de-
scribed above of any other operating loss of a foreign corporation. In addition, the
loss will normally reduce the gain or increase the loss recognized upon the subsequent
liquidation of the foreign corporation, or perhaps help to establish, as a factual
matter, the worthlessness of the United States investor's stock interest therein. See IRC
§ 165(g)(3). The limited utility of a capital loss on the taxable liquidation of a foreign
corporation suggests the possibility that a corporate United States investor whose
foreign corporation is faced with an inevitable expropriation of the corporation's
assets may well find it desirable to negotiate an expropriation of its stock interest.
Alternatively, the United States investor nmight seek to have the foreign corporation
obtain "compensation" in the form of a debt obligation of the foreign country, which
could be distributed in liquidation of the foreign corporation. A subsequent loss on
the obligation would produce an ordinary loss to a corporate shareholder in the
guise of a "bad debt" deduction under IRC § 166(a)(1). See Rev. Rul. 72-1, 1972-1
Cum. BULL. 52.
166. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(a) (1957).
167. The most noteworthy aspect of terminal losses is their effect on a taxpayer's
source of taxable income for purposes of the foreign tax credit limitation. See pp. 338-39
infra.
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the foreign tax credit limitation provisions. Under the "per country"
limitation, a United States taxpayer's credit for taxes paid to a given
country cannot exceed the proportion of the taxpayer's pre-credit
United States tax liability which the taxpayer's taxable income from
sources within that country bears to taxable income from all sources.',
Under the optional "overall" limitation, the credit for taxes paid
to all foreign countries cannot exceed the proportion of United
States tax liability which taxable income from sources without the
United States bears to taxable income from all sources. 00 Each form
of limitation requires determination of "taxable income" from cer-
tain geographical sources. The Code sets forth detailed rules gov-
erning the source of various items of gross income'10 and then
provides:
From the items of gross income specified . . . there shall be de-
ducted the expenses, losses, and other deductions properly appor-
tioned or allocated thereto, and a ratable part of any expenses,
losses, and other deductions which cannot definitely be allo-
cated to some item or class of gross income. 171
Losses will thus directly affect the size of the limitation by reducing
the amount of taxable income from various sources without the United
States.1
2
168. IRC § 904(a)(1). In algebraic terms the taxpayer's credit for taxes paid to a
given country is:
Taxable Income from Sources
Maximum Credit = Pre-Credit U.S. Tax X Within the Foreign 
Country
Total Taxable Income
169. IRO § 904(a)(2). Algebraically:
Taxable Income from
Maximum Credit = Pre-Credit U.S. Tax Foreign 
Sources
Total Taxable Income
It should be noted that the limitations apply separately to certain categories of
foreign-source income-interest income, IRC § 904(f)(l)(A); DISC dividends, IRC
§ 904(f)(l)(B); and other income, IRC § 904(f)(1)(C)-so that low-taxed income in one
category cannot lower the average effective foreign tax rate and thereby avoid the
limitation.
If there are foreign tax credits in a given year in excess of the limitation being
used, they may be carried over to other years in accordance with IRC § 904(d) and
allowed to the extent permitted for the carryover year.
170. IRC §§ 861(a), 862(a).
171. IRC §§ 861(b), 862(b).
172. Another effect of losses on the computation of the indirect foreign tax credit,
see p. 327 supra, occurs whenever foreign taxes are paid or accrued for a year in
which the foreign subsidiary has a deficit in its current earnings and profits account.
Here the "crack" question 'arises: Do foreign taxes paid for a year in which the sub-
sidiary has negative earnings and profits fall into a crack and become unavailable
as credits upon the payment of dividends, since the taxes are not paid "on or with
respect to" the earnings and profits of a particular year? Or should the year-by-year
credit computation ever be relaxed in this situation, in order to further the purpose
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While other considerations may militate against choice of the per-
country limitation, 17 3 it has one clear advantage to the taxpayer:
Under the per-country limitation on the foreign tax credit, losses
incurred in a foreign country by a United States taxpayer may pro-
duce a double tax benefit. First, the loss may reduce the United
States tax on domestic source income in the year of the loss. Second,
when business operations in the loss country become profitable, a
foreign tax credit will be allowed for the taxes of that country
against what would otherwise be the United States tax on the in-
come from that country. The latter is, in effect, an instance of asym-
metrical treatment of losses since profits from a given foreign coun-
try increase the per-country foreign tax credit limitation, while
losses do not decrease the limitation.
A second potential asymmetry results from the fact that a foreign
operating loss may affect the United States shareholder's indirect
foreign tax credit computations with respect to the foreign corpora-
tion for years other than the loss year. Section 902 allows certain
United States shareholders to deduct an indirect foreign tax credit
on dividends from foreign corporations. 174 If a current loss has an
of avoiding double taxation? There is as yet no authority on this question, which is
becoming increasingly important. This problem is illustrated by the potential effect of
a distribution in 1973 by a United Kingdom subsidiary of its current and accumulated
profits. The distribution may render the subsidiary liable for payment of Advanced
Corporation Tax ("ACT," computed at the rate of 3/7ths of the distribution) in an
amount exceeding the subsidiary's current earnings and profits. See Finance Act 1972,
c. 41, Part V, §§ 84-87, CCH BRITSH TAX GUIDE. If the tax is viewed as "on or with
respect to" the current earnings, the amount paid in excess of current earnings and
profits may fall into the crack. It may be difficult to characterize the ACT as imposed
on past profits since, under United Kingdom tax law, the ACT will reduce corporate
tax only on future profits. Perhaps the ACT will be treated as an advance payment
of tax on the profits of future years and allowed as a credit when those profits are
distributed. This particular problem urgently needs administrative resolution.
173. If the taxpayer has taxable income from sources within the United States and
at least one foreign country and a net loss in one or more other foreign countries,
the per country limitation will prevent the foreign loss from offsetting income from
another foreign country, thus increasing the taxpayer's effective foreign tax rate and
decreasing the foreign tax credit limitation which the overall method would permit.
If the taxpayer has a net loss in the United States and at least one foreign country
and taxable income front sources in one or more other foreign countries, the overall
limitation will permit a higher foreign tax credit where one or more foreign tax
rates are higher than the United States rate. See E. OWVNS, supra note 2, at 604-05.
Otherwise, the limitation under the per-country and overall methods will be the same,
as long as no country imposes its tax at an effective rate greater than the taxpayer's
effective United States tax rate.
174. A domestic corporate shareholder receives a credit for foreign income taxes
paid on the earnings and profits of a 10 percent-or-more owned first-tier foreign sub-
sidiary, a 10 percent (second-tier) subsidiary thereof, or a 10 percent (third-tier) sub-
sidiary of the second-tier subsidiary, provided such second- or third-tier subsidiary is ul-
timately 5 percent-or-more owned by the domestic parent corporation. IRC §§ 902(a)-(b).
If one of the controlled foreign corporations has subpart F income, then "special"
foreign tax credit rules provided by regulation, see Treas. Reg. § 1.963-4(c) (1964), permit
the United States corporate shareholder to compute its indirect foreign tax credit with
respect to dividends from the controlled foreign corporation on the basis of its earnings
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effect on the foreign tax credit computations for years other than the
loss year-either directly, by reducing earnings and profits for other
years, or indirectly, as the result of a tax benefit under foreign law
(such as a refund of foreign taxes paid for the earlier year)-then
the effect will not be symmetrical since gain will affect the com-
putation only for the current year.175
I1. Evaluation of Results of Application of the Symmetry Criterion
A significant number of asymmetries in the United States tax
treatment of foreign loss and foreign gain have been identified. Be-
fore the inference is drawn that these asymmetries ought to be elim-
inated, the soundness of the symmetry criterion will be further tested.
Implications of the symmetry principle will be compared with those
of the traditional criterion of neutrality and such pragmatic criteria
as domestic economic effects and administrative convenience.
A. Neutrality
A principal policy objective in taxation of foreign income, dis-
cussed in both the legislative history of particular provisions '" and
in analyses of this policy, 177 is neutrality. The term is often used in
and profits reduced by losses of any other member of a chain or group to which the
corporation belongs, with the result that dividends from one of the profitable members
will carry with them an "accelerated" foreign tax credit. The asymmetry here described
does not derive from the effects of losses under a "chain" election tinder subpart F,
however, but rather from the effect of the loss on the loss corporation itself.
175. This question is conceptually equivalent to the question of whether curtent
losses affect the minimum distribution computation in other years for corporations
with subpart F income, discussed in note 145 supra, since foreign "taxes paid" con-
stitute the numerator of both the indirect foreign tax credit formula, IRC §§ 902(a)-(b),
and the "effective foreign tax rate" fraction, IRC § 963(d), and "earnings and profits"
constitute all or part of the denominator of both the indirect foreign tax credit
formula, IRC §§ 902(a)-(b) and the "effective foreign tax rate" fraction, IRC § 963(d).
See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.902-3(c)(1), (2) (1965). Therefore, the analysis in note 145 supra
applies with equal validity here.
176. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1921) (predecessor of § 931
justified by competitive situation abroad, impliedly producing foreign neutrality); H.R.
REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. (1918); 1939-1 (Part 2) CuM. BULL. 93 (foreign tax
credit avoids double taxation, impliedly producing domestic neutrality).
177. See, e.g., E. OWENS, supra note 2, at 579; L. KRAUSE & K. DAM, FEDERAL TAX
TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INCOME 44-54, 87-90 (1964); P. MUSGRAVE, UNITED STATES TAXALTION
OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME: ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS 109-21 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as P. MUSGRAVE, ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS]; J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 140 (rev. ed.
1971); PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON BUSINESS TAXATION, BUSINESS TAXATION 34-35, 44-47
(1970); P. Musgrave, Tax Preferences to Foreign Investment, in COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS
PRESENTED TO JOINT ECONOMIC COMM.: PART 2-INTERNATIONAL SUBSIDIES, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 176, 181, 204 (1972); COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMIC POLICY, ANNUAL REPORT
62 (1973); COMMISSION TO REVISE THE TAX STRUCTURE, REFORMING THE FEDERAL TAX
STRUCTURE 13 (1973); General Tax Reform Panel Discussions (Part 11) on Taxation of
Foreign Income, Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
1693-95 (Statement of J. Glasmann), 1737-38, 1739-40 (Statement of T. Jenks), 1723
(Statement of S. Ross), 1762 (Statement of R. Stobaugh) (1973).
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two inconsistent senses-domestic neutrality7 s and foreign neu-
trality.1
70
Ideal domestic neutrality exists if tax considerations do not affect
a United States investor's choice between an investment project lo-
cated in the United States and an investment project located abroad.',,
This will be the case only if the taxes paid to the foreign jurisdiction
in which the investment is located and to the United States on ac-
count of the foreign investment are equal to the taxes that would
have been paid if the project were located in the United States. 81
With the total tax burden set equal to the United States level, in-
vestment decisions will be based solely on projections of pre-tax in-
come and other real economic factors. 8 2
Foreign neutrality, in the words of one commentator, is "equal
treatment of Americans investing in foreign operations and their
non-American competitors."' 8 3 In contrast to domestic neutrality's
requirement of equality to the United States investor of overall tax
rates on domestic and foreign income, foreign neutrality requires
equalization of the tax treatment of United States persons investing
abroad and the treatment accorded their foreign competitors by
foreign taxing jurisdictions. Such competitors fall into two categories
-investors who are indigenous to the tax jurisdiction where the
investment is made and investors from foreign countries other than
the United States. 84 True foreign neutrality will be impossible to
achieve if the total tax burden on indigenous investors differs even
slightly from the burden on non-United States foreign investors or
if there are differences in the overall tax burdens on foreign in-
vestors from various countries. Thus, because of the variety of tax
burdens imposed by foreign countries on non-American counterparts
of American investors, foreign neutrality is not a realistic goal of tax
policy.? -1 Therefore, the following discussion considers only the im-
plications of domestic neutrality. 86
178. See, e.g., L. KRwSE & K. DAM, supra note 177, at 46-52; P. MUSGRAVE, ISSUES
AND ARGUMENTS, Supra note 177, at 109-11 (Ms. Musgrave calls domestic neutrality "in-
ternational tax neutrality."); J. I'ECHMAN, supra note 177, at 140.
179. See, e.g., L. KRAUSE & K. DAMT, supra note 177, at 53-54; P. MUSGRAVE, ISSUES
AND ARGUMENIs 119-20 (Ms. Musgrave calls foreign neutrality "capital-import neutrality"
and states that it is "based on a false concept of neutrality," id. at 120.); J. PEC IMAN,
supra note 177, at 140.
180. See, e.g., J. PECHMAX, supra note 177, at 140.
181. See, e.g., L. KRAUSE & K. DAM, supra note 177, at 46-52; P. MUSCRAVE, IsUES
AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 177, at 109.
182. See, e.g., L. KRAUsE & K. DAm, supra note 177, at 45.
183. Id. at 45.
184. See id. at 53.
185. See id. at 53-54.
186. It may simply be noted that, in practical terms, the two concepts have pre-
cisely opposing implications. If it is assumed that the most common type of competitor
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The Code attempts a rough degree of domestic neutrality by grant-
ing a credit for foreign taxes paid directly or indirectly by a United
States investorlsT The credit provision, however, falls short of im-
posing the effective domestic tax rate on enterprises abroad since
other Code sections create significant non-neutralities. The most ob-
vious is the deferral of United States tax on the foreign earnings
of a controlled foreign subsidiary until repatriation.38 An invest-
ment project located abroad in a low-tax jurisdiction will be more
attractive because of the deferral privilege than an investment project
in the United States yielding the same pre-tax returns.189
Perfect domestic neutrality requires a tax system which preserves
the ratio of foreign and domestic pre-tax returns. 90 This could be
accomplished by elimination of the deferral privilege, allowance of
which a United States investor will face abroad will be an indigenous investor, then
foreign neutrality will be most closely approximated if the United States investor has
the same overall tax burden as the indigenous investor. Relying on assumptions once
again, if the indigenous and the United States investors are both taxed equally by
the investment jurisdiction, the foreign neutrality principle requires that the United
States forego taxing the proceeds earned by the United States investor so that his
overall tax burden will equal that of the indigenous investor.
A perfect and indefinite deferral privilege will achieve the closest possible approxi-
mation of foreign neutrality under these assumptions. If a United States investor enjoys
such a privilege, the effect will be to free his investment decisionmaking from the
inevitability of a United States tax, assuming no repatriation is contemplated, though
not to eliminate tax considerations from the investment decision.
Since with the help of perfect deferral a United States investor may choose the
taxing jurisdiction to which he will be subject and not be subject to additional United
States tax, an investment decision made under conditions of ideal foreign neutrality
will rest on two considerations: the projected pre-tax net income and the projected
tax burden. Thus while a United States investor under ideal domestic neutrality will
look only to projections of pre-tax earnings since the tax will in any event equal the
United States tax, a United States investor operating under conditions of ideal foreign
neutrality will look to projections of income net of taxes.
This difference reflects the basic inconsistency (given the stated assumptions) of
principles of domestic and foreign neutrality. The inconsistency is illustrated in the
present United States tax treatment of foreign income of controlled foreign subsid-
iaries. The privilege to defer indefinitely most United States tax on earnings of such
corporations is at the heart of whatever foreign neutrality the Code achieves since it
allows, at least to a limited extent, an investor to choose investment projects in juris-
dictions with taxes lower than those imposed by the United States and to enjoy the
benefits of the tax differential without United States tax consequences. This feature
is, on the other hand, the most significant deviation from whatever domestic neu-
trality the Code achieves, and for exactly the same reason. From the opposite per-
spective, the aspects of the Code which constitute deviations from ideal foreign neu-
trality, such as taxation of subpart F income, represent a tendency toward restoration
of domestic neutrality.
187. See IRC §§ 901-06, 960; P. MUSCRAvE, IssuEs AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 177,
at 113.
188. See p. 327 supra.
189. See P. MUSGRAVE, IssUEs AND ARGUMENTS 81-87 (Ms. Musgrave notes that the
deferral privilege is of benefit only in the interval before repatriation of the foreign
earnings to the United States shareholder of the foreign subsidiary); L. KRAUSE & K.
DAM, supra note 177, at 46; note 197 infra.
190. See L. KRAUSE & K. DAM 45-46; P. 'MUSGRAVE, ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS 109; J.
PECHMAN, supra note 177, at 140.
United States Tax Effects of Foreign Losses
credit for foreign tax without restriction as to amount,""' and ex-
tension of present tax incentives accorded investment in the United
States to investment projects located abroad.1
9 2
The implications of the symmetry criterion are basically consistent
with this "ideal" version of domestic neutrality. Symmetry requires
consistent treatment of gains and losses. If deferral of taxation on
accumulated earnings and profits of controlled foreign corporations
were ended, the symmetry principle would call for current deduc-
tibility of losses. This would coincide with "ideal" domestic neu-
trality since domestic corporations can generally deduct current
losses when computing taxable income.1
9 3
The fact that a system of taxation which creates ideal domestic
neutrality would be symmetrical reflects nothing more than the basic
symmetry in the United States tax treatment of domestic-source
gains and losses. The easy conclusion that symmetrization of present
provisions of the Code dealing with foreign income would always
promote domestic neutrality is, however, false.
In some instances symmetrization would appear to have the op-
posite effect. For example, symmetrization of subpart F'9 4 to allow
direct deduction of the loss equivalent of subpart F income' 9 will
tend to decrease the degree of domestic neutrality which subpart F
presently achieves in its asymmetrical treatment of income and loss.
Subpart F is a partial but not complete corrective to the basic non-
neutrality created by the deferral privilege.' 96 Allowing direct de-
duction of losses under subpart F will lessen the tax burden which
191. See P. MUSGRAVE, ISSUES AND AR(UMENTS 112-14 (Ms. Musgrave observes that
true neutrality would require the refund of any noncreditable excess of foreign taxes
over United States taxes on the same income, i.e., if the foreign tax rate exceeds the
domestic rate). At present, the neutrality achieved by the foreign tax credit is limited
by IRC § 904 to situations where the foreign tax rate does not exceed the United
States rate. See p. 338 supra. For arguments that full crediting of foreign taxes
(and presumably refund of noncreditable foreign taxes) encourages higher foreign tax
burdens which are, in effect, borne by the United States government, see P. MUSGRAvW,
ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS 87-88.
192. Certain United States tax incentives are presently restricted to property used
predominantly in the United States. See IRC § 167(m); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-ll(b)(2)
(iv) (1971) (maximum accelerated depreciation); IRC § 48(a)(2) (investment credit).
193. The only divergence would result from the fact that the system for taxing
domestic source gains and losses is itself asymmetrical in some instances. See, e.g., J.
PECHMtAN, supra note 177, at 98 (treatment of domestic capital losses asymmetrical since
they are not deductible in full against both capital gains and ordinary income).
194. IRC §§ 951-64.
195. See p. 332 supra & p. 350 infra.
196. Subpart F ended deferral primarily on holding company investment income
and income earned by corporations established in tax-haven countries in order to take
advantage of the low rate there. It did not entirely vitiate the non-neutrality created
by the deferral privilege. See, e.g., L. KRAUSE & K. DAM, supra note 177, at 52; P.
MUSGRAVE, ISSUES AND ARcUMENTS, supra note 177, at 85-87; J. PECHMAN, supra note
177, at 140.
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the provision presently creates. This, in turn, will reduce the overall
corrective impact of subpart F on the non-neutrality created by the
deferral privilege .
9 7
However, in most cases symmetrization of existing provisions will
tend to increase the overall degree of domestic neutrality achieved
by the Code by equalizing effective tax burdens paid by United
States investors on foreign and domestic investment. 99 Thus the
implications for reform which emerge from the symmetry analysis
are generally consistent with the principle of domestic neutrality.' 9 t'
B. Pragmatic Criteria
1. National Growth
From the national growth point of view, taxation of foreign in-
come should perhaps be heavier than taxation of domestic income
197. In two other cases, symmetrization might enhance existing non-neutrality in the
Code. If the restriction on losses attributable to earned income incurred by citizens
abroad were symmetrized to accord with the exemption of the first S20,000 or S25,001
of earnings by such citizens from United States tax, see p. 349 infra, then the effect
would be to increase the attractiveness, from a tax standpoint, of foreign employment.
This, in turn, would enhance the existing non-neutrality of the citizens abroad ex-
emption.
Symmetrization of § 1248 to allow ordinary loss treatment for terminal losses incurred
in the disposition of a controlled foreign subsidiary, see p. 351 infra, would tend to
reduce the overall tax burdens imposed by the section. The section is already an in-
adequate antidote to the non-neutrality created by the deferral privilege. See, e.g., L.
KRAUSE & K. DAM, supra note 177, at 46-47; 1'. MUSGRAVE, IsSUES AND ARGUMENTS,
supra note 177, at 81-82. Therefore, symmetrization of § 1248 would, by diminishing
the adverse impact of the section on the taxpayer, intensify the existing non-neutrality
created by deferral.
198. In the following instances, symmetrization would tend to increase the overall
degree of neutrality achieved by the Code:
Timing of foreign subsidiary incorporation. See pp. 328-29 supra & p. 348 infra.
if deferral were denied altogether as a corrective measure, there would be a high
degree of neutrality. If "recapture" of the initial loss were required, a lesser degree
of neutrality would be achieved.
Possessions corporation. See pp. 321-23 supra & p. 349 infra. Section 931 is pres-
ently non-neutral because it allows a United States investor to take advantage of
lower tax rates in the possessions and be exempt from United States tax. The "double-
win" asymmetry increases the tax incentive to invest in the possessions. Symmetrization
would reduce the incentive and thus promote neutrality.
WHTC. See pp. 325-26 supra & pp. 349-50 infra. The special reduced rate of taxa-
tion of WHrC income is non-neutral. The asymmetrical allowance of loss deductions
without limit increases this non-neutrality. Thus, symmetrization would lead to greater
neutrality.
Contiguous Country Corporations. See pp. 329-30 supra & p. 350 infra. Such
corporations exhibit the non-neutrality of deferral as do other controlled foreign sub-
sidiaries. But the contiguous country status creates an additional potential tax advan-
tage: the ability to offset other United States-taxable income with losses during un-
profitable years but defer United States taxation of income in profitable years. This
"double-win" asymmetry enhances the non-neutrality of the deferral privilege. Sym-
metrization would eliminate any non-neutrality except that created by deferral.
199. Discussion of the implications of a second traditional principle-domestic equity
-is omitted since equity is substantially the same as the neutrality principle viewed
from the perspective of what burden the taxpayer "ought" to bear rather than what
degree of incentive or nonincentive the tax system should give to various investment
decisions. See L. KRAuSE & K. DAM, supra note 177, at 44, 54-56.
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in order to prevent foreign investment from unduly reducing the
level of domestic investment and limiting the growth of domestic
output. Here the economic argument is that a United States com-
pany's investment in production facilities abroad reduces its funds
for domestic investment in itself, and the negative multiplier effects
throughout the economy exceed any expansionary effects of increased
exports attributable to the foreign facilities. Accordingly, foreign
investment is said to lead to a slower growth of the domestic econ-
omny. 20° This argument has been shown to be limited, however, to
situations where the domestic economy is at full employment levels
for all domestic resources or where sectors of the domestic economy
experience "resource bottlenecks" or sectoral full employment. 201 One
can generalize that the symmetry criterion will be consistent with
national growth whenever the implication of symmetry is to increase
the tax costs of foreign investment under the present scheme of rules.
Symmetrization of gain and loss treatment would increase the tax
cost in some instances 202 and decrease it in others.203
Thus, the symmetry criterion is not completely consistent with
the implications of the national growth theory. This divergence may
not be significant if the national growth theory is limited to the
special cases of full resource employment noted above.204 In any
event, the as yet inconclusive nature of the underlying economic
argument makes the national growth measuring rod a very inexact
one for judging the symmetry criterion.
2. Efficiency
Maximum national efficiency requires that the gross (before tax)
returns on domestic investment be equal to the net (of foreign taxes)
return on foreign investment, because national income includes gross
returns from domestic investment but only the net return on foreign
investment. Foreign investment is profitable to a private investor,
however, beyond the point where it is profitable to the nation, since
200. P. MUSGRAVE, ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 177, at 16-17; L. KRAUSE & K.
DAxM, supra note 177, at 56-62.
201. L. KRAUSE & K. DAM 56-62.
202. Introduction of symmetrical treatment to losses of possessions corporations, for
instance, would increase the overall tax costs of this form of foreign investment and
would thereby be consistent with the national growth objective. See note 198 supra.
203. The symmetrization of subpart F, for instance, to allow direct use by a United
States investor of certain types of losses of a foreign subsidiary would lower the rela-
tive United States tax costs of such investment and thus diverge from the domestic
growth principle. See pp. 343-44 supra.
20f. If, on the other hand, full resource employment becomes a continuing problem,
national growth may well become a fairly low national priority. See generally D.
MIEADOWS, D. I,EADOWS, J. RANDERS, W. BEHRENS, TnE LIMITS TO GROWTH (1972).
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the private investor will invest abroad up to the point where the
net return on its foreign investments equals the net return on its
domestic investments.
2 05
The only way to meet the national efficiency criterion appears
to be repeal of the foreign tax credit and elimination of deferral. 2 '3
Symmetrical treatment of foreign losses will sometimes be consistent
with this criterion. This is not so in all areas, however, particularly
where symmetry will reduce present foreign investment costs. But
again, while focusing on an important economic consideration, we
have in hand an inadequate yardstick for judging the symmetry cri-
terion. It may well be that national efficiency will not merit top
priority in the formulation of international economic policy in view
of the current emphasis on trade, development, and energy.
207
3. Administrative Convenience
Here the question is whether applying the symmetry criterion to
reform the United States taxation of foreign losses would generate
increased administrative difficulties, for the government or for tax-
payers.
One way in which both parties would be well served is in the
certainty which symmetrical treatment of losses would afford each.
It is clear that the present rules are uncertain in a number of areas.
Symmetrization would reduce this uncertainty. A symmetrical charac-
ter rule for terminal losses, for instance, would take a good deal of
heat off the application of § 165(g) (3), which forces taxpayers to
kill their subsidiaries with the utmost care and planning and which
forces the government to stretch to find the tiniest bit of value
received in order to deny the taxpayer an ordinary loss.
20 8
Apart from reducing legal complexities in this area, symmetrical
treatment of losses would aid taxpayers in their financial planning.
A discontinuous rate-of-return function, which must be used under
the present tax system wherever losses and profits are not taxed sym-
205. Repeal of the foreign tax credit and elimination of deferral are suggested as
means for increasing national efficiency by bringing the private investor's tests for
profitability in line with the nation's. See P. MUSGRAVE, ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS, Supra
note 177, at 134.
206. Id.
207. See COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY, supra note 177.
208. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-5(b) (1960) provides that stock or securities must become
"wholly" worthless. See 875 Park Ave. Co. v. Commissioner, 217 F.2d 699 (2d Cir.
1954) (shrinkage of common stock value from $100 to $.84 per share not "worthless-
ness"). Legal complexities in the tax system, such as those discussed in this article,
produce a massive misallocation of resources-called the "deadweight loss"-which has
been increasingly recognized as a significant factor in the formulation of tax policy.
See, e.g., COMMISSION TO REVISE THE TAX STRUCTURE, supra note 177, at 13-14.
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metrically, makes investment analysis more cumbersome than it would
be with the continuous function which a symmetrical tax system
would make possible.
200
Finally, one might ask whether symmetrical treatment of losses
would not increase their significance and thus increase the govern-
ment's auditing job. The considerations here are manifold. First,
losses are already significant, and the administrative problem is that
no one really knows in what way. Second, as noted, symmetrical
treatment would decrease the auditing effort to some extent by
eliminating some potential legal controversies. On the other hand,
permitting a foreign subsidiary's losses to offset directly the income
of its United States parent corporation would undoubtedly increase
the number of taxable entities which the Internal Revenue Service
has to audit.2
10
4. Results of Evaluation of the Symmetry Criterion
The implications of the symmetry criterion generally coincide with
those of the domestic neutrality standard in the context of foreign
losses. While the symmetry implications sometimes conflict with
the goals of national growth and national efficiency, these goals them-
selves are of uncertain significance and thus should not serve
as a conclusive test of the validity of the symmetry criterion. Finally,
while symmetrization would increase the administrative burden on
the Internal Revenue Service somewhat, it would vastly simplify
financial planning by United States taxpayers. The conclusion which
emerges is that asymmetries in the United States tax effects of foreign
profits and losses should be eliminated wherever possible.
IV. Implications for Reform
The application of the symmetry principle to the Code provisions
presently governing United States tax treatment of foreign income
and loss has revealed a number of asymmetries. Technical changes
209. Cf. R. SCHLAIFER, PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS DECISIONS § 5.3.2 (1959).
210. In the case of foreign subsidiaries subject to scrutiny by a foreign taxing juris-
diction, however, the Service might alleviate the audit problem through reliance on
the foreign jurisdiction. Alternatively, weight might be given independently significant
accounting determinations of the subsidiary's losses, such as certified reports to share-
holders. The accounting profession's principles include the consolidation of the op-
erating results of domestic corporations with their foreign subsidiaries, AICPA, AcCT'G
RESEARCHi BULL. No. 43, ch. 12, 8-9, and even more significantly normally require
full provisions for the United States and foreign taxes ultimately payable on the re-
patriation of earnings of a foreign subsidiary, Acct'g Principles Board, Opinion No. 23
(April 1972).
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in the form of amendments to specific Code sections and regulations
would largely eliminate these asymmetries. In addition to pointing
up the need for such changes, the symmetry criterion also bears on
the broader issue of the desirability of basic reforms in the system
for taxing foreign income.
A. Technical Changes
1. Timing of Foreign Subsidiary Incorporation
The asymmetry which results from the ability of a domestic cor-
poration to obtain deductible losses during the unprofitable "start-
up" years of a foreign enterprise by operating it as a branch and
then, when it becomes profitable, to shield its earnings from United
States tax by incorporating it as a foreign subsidiary,211 might prove
difficult to correct within the framework of current Code provisions.
In theory, the straddle approach of separating deductible losses
from nontaxable profits or the incorporation itself might be attacked
under existing judicial212 or statutory213 doctrines. The government
has used these approaches rather sparingly in the foreign field, how-
ever, particularly in recent times after losing all but the most glaring
cases in earlier periods.2 14 The annual accounting doctrine may well
prove a serious impediment to corrective administrative action in
this area, as the present administration seems to concede.21 A legis-
lative solution may thus be necessary. Possible approaches would
include a "recapture" requirement or denial of the benefit of de-
ferral of United States tax on the income of the new foreign cor-
poration.
216
211. See pp. 318 & 328-29 supra.
212. A court might extend the "step transaction" doctrine to disallow the losses
incurred in anticipation of a foreign incorporation transaction. Cf. Hay v. Commissioner,
145 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 863 (1945).
213. IRO §§ 269(a)(1), 482. But cf. Siegel, 45 T.C. 566 (1966), acquiescence, 1966-2
CUM. BULL. 7; Rev. Rul. 70-238, 1970-1 Cuzs. BULL. 61 (holding formation of WHTC,
subject to favorable tax treatment like a foreign subsidiary, does not constitute tax
avoidance proscribed by § 269).
214. See, e.g., Siegel, 45 T.C. 566 (1966). For a government win see Kaspare Cohn
Co., 35 B.T.A. 646 (1937). An alternative approach would be for the Internal Revenue
Service to refuse to issue advance rulings under § 367 on foreign incorporations unlcs
the United States transferor agrees to "recapture" any earlier losses of the predecessor
business. The recapture might take the form of payment of a "tollcharge" measured
by the tax benefits realized from the prior losses, since the Service already imposes
similar conditions on issuance of § 367 rulings in other areas. See Rev. Proc. 68-23,
§§ 3.01(1), 3.02(l)(d), 3.03(l)(b), (f)-(g), and 5.02, 1968-1 Cura. BULL. 821.
215. See note 116 supra.
216. The administration has proposed the former course. See id.
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2. United States Citizens Abroad
Since only the first $20,000 or $25,000 of earned income of a United
States citizen abroad is exempt, the symmetry criterion would re-
quire that only the first $20,000 or $25,000 of operating losses be
denied the citizen abroad.
2 17
3. Possessions Corporation
Since a "possessions corporation" is exempt from United States tax
on its foreign source income, the symmetry criterion would require
that the corporation's losses not offset income otherwise subject to
tax. '-"- , Specifically, the losses should not reduce the corporation's in-
come by carryovers to years in which it fails to qualify as a posses-
sions corporation, and the losses should not reduce the income of
members of a consolidated group of corporations.2 1 9
4. JVestern Hemisphere Trade Corporations
The implication of the symmetry criterion for the taxation of
WHTC's is relatively straightforward. Just as the Code subjects the
taxable income of a WHTC to a maximum tax rate 14 percentage
points below the top corporate rate, it should restrict the use of
losses of a WHTC..22 0 They should offset in full only income of
the corporation in carryover years in which it meets the WHTC defi-
nitional tests. In other cases, including carryover years in which the
affiliated group 22 ' consists of any non-WHTC's, the losses should be
217. See pp. 318-20 supra. A simple amendment to the regulations providing for
the disallowance of expenses related to exempt profits would suffice. For a possible
model, see Treas. Reg. § 1.911-1(a)(3) (1957) (disallowing deductions attributable to
excludable gross income).
218. See pp. 321-23 supra.
219. Probably the most direct approach would be to follow the model provided for
foreign corporations and, in all events, deny the possessions corporation all deductions
other than those attributable to the income from sources within the United States
and amounts received within the United States which are subject to tax. Thus denied
deductions attributable to its business operations in one or more possessions, there
would be no net losses from such operations to offset other income of the possessions
corporation or of related corporations. This result, consistent with the symmetry cri-
terion, would resolve the problem presented in Burke Concrete Accessories, 56 T.C.
588 (1971), and in Rev. Rul. 73498, 1973 INT. REV. BULL. No. 46, at 19, regardless
of whether the consolidated return provisions are clarified. It would be possible to
make the suggested change through an amendment to the regulations. Amendments
to the § 931 regulations could provide, on the authority of IRG § 265(1), for disallow-
ance of deductions attributable to gross income excluded under § 931(a), and make
§ 931(a) mandatory, not elective, to all corporations which meet its terms.
220. See pp. 325-26 supra.
221. If the changes suggested herein are implemented, WHTC's ought to be allowed
to continue to be members of affiliated groups, since the proportional reduction of
deductible losses will eliminate the present "consolidation" asymmetry, described at pp.
320-21 supra.
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fractionally reduced so that they offset other income only to the
extent that such income would be taxable in the hands of a WHTC. " -2
5. Contiguous Country Subsidiaries
The asymmetry resulting from the ability of such corporations to
offset other taxable income with their losses during unprofitable
years but to defer United States taxation of income in profitable
years22 3 resembles the asymmetry created by the incorporation as a
foreign subsidiary of a branch with a history of loss but a prospect




The most far-reaching implications of the symmetry criterion af-
fect the operation of subpart F.22 In particular, losses from transac-
tions which would have produced subpart F income should be cur-
rently deductible by the United States shareholder. This change
would permit simplification of the existing rules governing carryovers
of deficits and minimum distributions.
just as the rules governing the current taxation of subpart F
income are extremely complex, providing for the current deducti-
bility of losses from transactions which would have produced sub-
part F income if profitable would also be a complex undertaking.
The best approach would probably be to begin with the existing
framework of rules defining and taxing "subpart F income" and
to modify them by legislation to provide for addition of negative
amounts thereof to the gross income of United States shareholders.
2 27
222. The most direct means to this end would be to provide that the losses must
be reduced by the § 922 fraction before they are carried over to other years or used
by non-WHTC members of a consolidated group. Under this proposal, for example,
a WHTC's operating loss of S1OO would be reduced by $29 [(14/48) X (.l00)] to S71,
which might carry over to non-WHTC years or reduce the taxable income of non-
WVHTC corporations.
223. See pp. 329-30 supra.
224. See pp. 318 & 328-29 supra.
225. The possibilities include a "recapture" requirement, denial of the benefit of
deferral of United States tax to the extent of prior losses, or complete elimination of
deferral by making a § 1504(d) election irrevocable.
226. See pp. 330-34 supra.
227. Even this approach would generate its own complexities. For example, does
the rule cover transactions involving negative gross profit? How does the "30-70" rule
apply? How should the shareholder take the losses into account in computing its
"deemed-paid" foreign tax credit and the overall or per country limitation thereon?
Whatever the difficulty in providing for the current deduction of subpart F losses,
the difficulty would be offset somewhat by the simultaneous elimination of the com-
plex special loss rules applicable to the computation of subpart F income and to
Vol. 83: 312, 1973
United States Tax Effects of Foreign Losses
If this approach is deemed too drastic a departure from current
practice, the Treasury could at least eliminate the potentially asym-
metrical effect of gains and losses on the computation of minimum
distribution amounts under subpart F22 8 by making clear-through
regulation or ruling-that earnings and profits of a foreign corpora-
tion with a current loss will be a negative amount, i.e., the amount
of the loss offset by the amount of any related refund of foreign taxes.
Finally, the asymmetrical effect of foreign currency gains and
losses on the indirect foreign tax credit of § 902 under subpart F229
could be corrected by requiring in all cases that unrealized currency
gains and losses be taken into account for purposes of computing
the § 902 foreign tax credit.
7. Terminal Losses
a. Character
The treatment of gain and loss on the sale or exchange of stock
of a controlled foreign corporation or on the liquidation thereof
is asymmetrical since gains are taxed as ordinary income, to the ex-
tent of the earnings and profits of the corporation, while losses on
the disposition of an interest in the corporation are normally capital
losses.2 3" The symmetry criterion would indicate that losses on sales
and exchanges, as well as liquidations, should be ordinary in char-
acter, at least to the extent of any deficit in the earnings and profits
account of the controlled foreign corporation. Such a rule might
obviate the need for the special rules for worthlessness and expro-
priation, which have proved tantalizing targets for the tax planning
efforts of taxpayers with unsuccessful foreign operations.
b. Source
Symmetry requires that the source of terminal losses, like the
source of terminal gains, be determined on an independent basis.
231
minimum distributions and the related deemed-paid foreign tax credits. Since the
symmetry criterion would provide for direct deduction of losses of a controlled cor-
poration, the deficit rules of §§ 952(c)-(d) might be repealed. See note 132 supra.
228. See p. 332 supra.
229. See pp. 333-34 supra.
230. See pp. 335-36 supra. The principal exceptions on the loss side occur in the
context of worthless stock of certain subsidiaries and expropriations, where ordinary
loss may result.
231. See p. 337 supra. Some case law suggests that such losses may have an
independent source. See Commissioner v. Ferro-Enamel Corp., 134 F.2d 564 (6th Cir.
1943), rev'g 1942 B.T.A. Memo No. 107; Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 40 B.T.A. 107
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8. Foreign Tax Credit
The asymmetrical impact of gains and losses on the per-country
foreign tax credit limitation-profits increase the limitation but losses
do not decrease it 232-probably requires a legislative solution. One
method of remedying this double tax benefit situation would be to
amend the foreign tax credit limitation provisions to eliminate the
per-country limitation, since losses and gains have symmetrical ef-
fects under the overall limitation. A second approach, and one which
has been advanced seriously by the Treasury,233 is to reduce the
limitation on the foreign tax credit in subsequent years after the
United States taxpayer sustains a foreign loss. 2 3 4
The second potential asymmetry in the foreign tax credit context
-gains will affect computation of the credit only for the current year
but a current loss may affect the credit computation for other years230
-is equivalent to the minimum distribution asymmetry in subpart F
and the same symmetrization advocated there (restriction of the im-
pact of loss to the current year) is appropriate here.230
B. Changes in the Basic System for Taxing Foreign Income
The previous section has touched on relatively narrow technical
changes which application of the symmetry criterion to the present
United States tax law would require. It seems proper at this point
to ask whether this examination of the tax effects of foreign losses
carries with it any implications for broader changes in the basic
United States system for taxing foreign income.
While previous legislation in the foreign area tended to be "lib-
eralizing," in the sense of reducing the United States tax burden on
foreign income, the Revenue Act of 1962 was the first effort of wide
scope to increase the burden.
23 7
(1939); Royal Ins. Co., 38 B.T.A. 955 (1938); De Nederlandsche Bank, 35 B.T.A. 53
(1936). The symmetry criterion would indicate that this case law, which is imperfectly
reflected in recently proposed regulations, see Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(e)(8), 38
Fed. Reg. 15840 (1973), should be approved and followed.
232. See pp. 338-39 supra.
233. See Proposals for Tax Change, supra note 9, at 169-75.
234. Mechanically, the reduction in the limitation could take the form of a re-
duction in taxable income from sources within the country of the loss in later years
when the United States taxpayer derives income from sources within that country.
235. See pp. 339-40 supra.
236. See p. 351 supra.
237. President Kennedy had sought far-reaching changes including an end to de-
ferral. See Hearings on the President's 1961 Tax Recommendations Before the HouLse
Ways and Means Comm., 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 8-10, 260-65, 301 passim (1961). The
1962 Act, however, was directed only at certain "abuses," such as tax haven opera-
tions, "captive" insurance companies, and disguised dividends consisting of "increased
investment in United States property." It contained a number of relief provisions
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Since 1962, nearly all congressional enactments affecting the taxa-
tion of foreign income of United States persons have been fairly
technical. 23S The declining balances of trade and payments, coupled
with a resulting loss of confidence in the international value of the
dollar, rates of unemployment unacceptably high to some congres-
sional and most labor leaders, and a suspicion that the United States
tax advantages accorded foreign investment have produced an "ex-
port of jobs," have led to a renewed legislative interest in curtailing
these advantages.23 9
The question of the proper congressional response to current legis-
lative proposals must be answered on the basis of economic analysis
of the effects of the various legislative alternatives in light of the
priorities assigned to objectives of our international economic policy
such as balance of payments, growth, efficiency, and domestic employ-
ment. While it would be frivolous to suggest that symmetry should
provide the touchstone here, it is submitted that the desirability for
simplification of the Code provisions in this complex area, which
symmetrization would effect, provides respectable support for any pro-
posed system which meets other policy objectives.
Each of the recent proposals for change of the present system of
taxing foreign income has one common element-the elimination to
some extent of the deferral of United States tax on the foreign in-
come of controlled foreign corporations. 24 0 One of the most commonly
which have apparently enabled United States multinational corporations to cope with
its complex provisions without serious complaints. See, e.g., Statement of T. Jenks,
supra note 177, at 1740-42 (criticizing only the United States property provision of
subpart F, despite complexity of other subpart F provisions).
238. Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809: §§ 104(j), (k), 80 Stat.
1562-63 (amendments to subpart F and § 1248 to conform to "effectively connected"
concept applicable to resident aliens and foreign corporations) (codified at IRC §§ 952(b),
1248(d)(4)); § 106, 80 Stat. 1568-71 (foreign tax credit for nonresident aliens and foreign
corporations) (codified at IRO § 906 and other scattered IRC sections); Tax Reform
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172: § 505, 83 Stat. 634 (clarification of status of con-
tinental shelf areas for source of income purposes) (codified at IRC §§ 638, 1441(f));
§ 506, 83 Stat. 634-35 (limitation on foreign tax credit with respect to certain mineral
income) (codified at IRC § 901(e)); § 909, 83 Stat. 718 (modification of exclusion from
foreign base company income where tax avoidance not involved) (codified at IRC
§ 954(b)(4)); Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178: § 313(e), 85 Stat. 528 (with-
holding on dividends to foreign corporations) (codified at IRC § 1442(a)); §§ 501-07,
85 Stat. 535-53 (DISC) (codified at IRC §§ 991-97 and other scattered IRO sections).
The only broad-scale enactment has been the DISC provisions, which had the purpose
of stimulating exports and improving the rapidly deteriorating balance of trade.
239. See note 9 supra. The first of the legislative proposals, and the most drastic
to date, is the Burke-Hartke Bill. Id. More recently, and less drastically, the adminis-
tration advanced in connection with its Trade Bill, H.R. 6767, 93d Cong., Ist Sess.
(1973), tax proposals ending deferral in the case of controlled foreign corporations
which take advantage of foreign "tax holidays" and similar incentives or which
establish "run away plants" abroad, modifying the limitation on the foreign tax
credit, and providing for "'recapture" of certain foreign losses. See Proposals for Tax
Change, supra note 9.
240. See note 9 supra.
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proposed means of elimination of deferral is broadening the impact
of subpart F.2 41 This approach has a serious shortcoming, however.
Subpart F and related provisions make earnings and profits a most
important measuring rod.242 Problems arise from the fact that some
items of income and expenditure are included in the computation of
taxable income, but not of earnings and profits,
243 or vice versa, 2 44
and from the fact that various transactional operations on earnings
and profits are not fully defined.
2 4
5
These problems have led to suggestions that any elimination of
deferral should take the form of direct taxation of the taxable in-
come of controlled foreign subsidiaries, not their earnings and prof-
its, 240 presumably as a means of eliminating undue complexity in the
Code. This may be accomplished by extension of the consolidated
return rules, on a mandatory basis, to all controlled foreign sub-
sidiaries of United States shareholders.24 7 This system would seem
241. See, e.g., the Burke-Hartke Bill, supra note 9.
242. The amount of earnings and-profits of a controlled foreign corporation governs
the amounts included in, see IRC §§ 952(c), 955, 956, and excluded from, see IRC
§ 963, a United States shareholder's gross income.
243. For example, the amounts expended for payment of federal income taxes, see
Rev. Rul. 63-63, 1963-1 CUM. BULL. 10.
244. For example, exempt income such as interest on tax exempt municipal bonds.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.312-6(b) (1955).
245. For example, redemptions. See Baker v. United States, 460 F.2d 827 (6th Cir.
1972). See generally B. BiTrKER & J. EusTicE, supra note 56, at 7.03. To be sure, the
Treasury has promulgated detailed rules under § 964 for the computation of earnings
and profits for purposes of subpart F. Treas. Reg. § 1.964-1 (1964).
Even these rules, however, fail to resolve many important practical problems. Part
of the difficulty here stems from the existence of several earnings and profits concepts
within subpart F. Compare IRC §§ 952(c), (d), with § 963 and § 1248. Additional com-
plexity results from the extremely important role of earnings and profits in the
computation of the indirect foreign tax credit, see note 175 supra, and the unknown
or undefined role of §§ 367 and 381 in certain corporate liquidations and reorgani-
zations involving second- and higher-tier foreign subsidiaries. See T.I.R. 978, May 24,
1968. Cf. Rev. Rul. 70-373, 1970-2 Cume. BULL. 152; Rev. Rul. 68-351, 1968-2 CuM.
BULL. 307. See generally Cole, A Treasury View of Progress and Problems in the In.
ternational- Tax Field, 36 J. TAx. 124 (1972); Landis & Currier, The Future of Section 367,
25 TAx LAW. 253 (1972).
246. See, e.g., Statement of J. Glasmann, supra note 177, at 1696.
247. Such an approach would, of course, tax only subsidiaries of corporate share-
holders. Equity may demand direct taxation of foreign corporations owned by indi-
viduals as well. If so, the consolidated return rules might be supplemented by addi-
tional rules covering individuals.
Some foreign tax jurisdictions have instituted a consolidation system, though on a
permissive basis. Foreign subsidiaries of French and German corporations may elect
to report the taxable income (or losses) of their foreign operations on a consolidated
basis under certain circumstances, although they are not required to do so. See Code
Gfnfral Des Imp6ts, art. 209 quinquies; Steueranpassungsgesetz § 15(2), Auslandsinves-
titionsgesetz (Art. 2 of the Tax Amendment Law of 1969 of 18 August 1969, BGB I
1969 I, at 1211). For analysis of the French system, see A Comparative Analysis of the
Classical, Dual Rate, and Imputation Taxation Systems and an Examination of the
354
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to solve the technical problems of foreign startup losses,2 4 8 permit
the abolition of subpart F with its numerous complexities within and
without the loss area,240 render moot the semi-explored niceties of
the indirect foreign tax credit,2 0 and reduce the importance of the
exceptions to the general rule that terminal losses on foreign direct
investments are capital in character.2 ' Indirect effects of the adop-
tion of a consolidation approach would be a dramatic reduction of
the need for application of § 482 in the foreign area252 with at-
tendant gains in national and international tax administration, a
possible narrowing of the scope of §§ 36 7253 and 1491-92, and the
elimination of some definitional problems of § 1504(d).254 Moreover,
adoption of the consolidated return rules in the foreign area would
provide the framework for extension of complete domestic tax neu-
trality to the United States taxation of foreign income, including
Corporate Tax Systems in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom, 12 EUROPEAN TAxATION 1/112, 1/154 (1972). For analysis of the Ger-
man system, see CCH WORLD TAX SERIEs: GERMANY ch. 11/2.2d (2d ed. 1969).
248. See pp. 318 & 328-29 supra. The incorporation step would not avoid taxes,
since the foreign transferee corporation would be subject to tax.
249. See pp. 330-34 supra; PRESIDENT'S TAsK FORCE ON BusiNEss TAxATION, supra
note 177, at 35, 47, recommending, inter alia, revision of the present subpart F pro-
visions to include only an improper accumulations test.
250. See notes 145 & 175 supra.
251. See p. 336 supra.
252. IRC § 482 permits the Secretary of the Treasury to allocate gross income and
deductions between or among organizations controlled by the same interests, upon a
determination that the allocation is necessary to prevent the evasion of taxes or clearly
to reflect the income of the organizations. The authorities consistently articulate the
standard guiding the Treasury's application of § 482 to controlled taxpayers as arm's-
length dealings among uncontrolled taxpayers. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (1968).
In the international context, the Internal Revenue Service has most commonly ap-
plied this provision to allocate income on the sale of property from a foreign sub-
sidiary corporation, exempt from United States tax, to a taxable controlling United
States shareholder. See Treasury Department, Summary Study of International Cases
Involving Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code, January 8, 1973.
Section 482 is a "one-way" street: A taxpayer may not invoke the section where it
inadvertently overpriced property, funds, or services to a foreign subsidiary, causing a
loss to the subsidiary. But cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(3) (1962). The one-way street
nature of § 482 cuts particularly deeply in the foreign area. Because a foreign sub-
sidiary without any United States connected income will be exempt from United
States income tax while its domestic parent corporation will be subject to the full
United States corporate tax rate, the parent corporation will feel acute pressure to
err on the low side in setting prices to its foreign affiliates. If the parent company
charges a price which is determined (with hindsight) to be too high, the taxpayer
cannot invoke § 482 to reduce the price to an arms-length level. This aspect of § 482
is double-edged, since the foreign country of an affiliate may identify the overcharge,
invoke its version of § 482, and in effect tax all or part of the income which the parent
corporation has already reported for United States income tax purposes. If foreign
subsidiaries could be included in an affiliated group of corporations filing a con-
solidated return, the "one-way street" view of § 482 would not present a United States
tax problem, since the income of both the parent corporation and its foreign affil-
iates would be subject to United States tax currently. The foreign tax problem, of
course, would remain.
253. See note 115 supra.
254. See note 118 supra.
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accelerated depreciation, the ADR rules, the investment credit, and
percentage depletion.
2- 5
Finally, the adoption of the consolidation approach would be a
convenient means for eradicating many of the present asymmetries in
the United States tax treatment of foreign gain and loss. 2 50
255. The stakes involved in the elimination of deferral are not at all clear, although
they are apparently not so low as indicated by the 1970 average effective foreign tax
rate of 43.3 percent (before withholding taxes) for foreign corporations controlled by
United States persons. UNITED SrATrEs TARIFF CoMMissioN, REPORr 10 SENAT1E CO"MIM.
ON FINANCE, 93D CONC., IST SESS., IMPLICATIONS OF !%IuLrINA'IIONAL FIRMIS FOR WORLD
TRADE AND INvEsTMENr AND FOR U.S. TRADE AND LABOR 444 (1973). In proposing
elimination of deferral where a foreign corporation receives the benefits of a foreign
tax holiday or other tax incentives-a proposal which, most multinationals complained,
would almost completely end deferral-the Treasury estimated that there would be no
.'substantial" revenue gain. Proposals for Tax Change, supra note 9, at 161.
256. The asymmetries which would be eliminated would be those discussed herein
with respect to start-up losses, contiguous country subsidiaries, subpart F, the indirect
foreign tax credit, and terminal losses in situations where § 1248 would apply if gain
were present. Remaining asymmetries would include those under the Code provisions
applicable to citizens and domestic corporations (IRC §§ 911, 921-22, 931, 991-97) and
the foreign tax credit limitation.
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